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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to U.C.A. 
§78-2a-3(2)(h). Addendum D. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES/STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Whether the trial court erred in disqualifying opposing counsel as to trial when the 
party seeking the disqualification knew of the potential problem or conflict for sixteen 
(16) months before bringing a motion to disqualify said counsel and failed to 
"immediately file" and "diligently pursue" her case. The standard of review for this issue 
is correction of error. 
Whether the trial court erred in applying URPC 3.7 to disqualify an opposing 
counsel as to trial when requiring counsel to withdraw would cause a "serious hardship" 
to respondent and would, thereby, cause serious prejudice to the Respondent. The 
standard of review for this issue is correction of error. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The parties herein were divorced on January 5, 2005. On September 2, 2005, the 
Petitioner/Appellee (Williams) filed a Petition with this court seeking to modify the 
decree of divorce. The Respondent/Appellant (Madson) retained as his counsel Ronald 
R. Madson who filed an Answer to the Petition in September of 2005 and as the file 
reflects, for the next one year and three month the parties engaged in extensive litigation 
and discovery. See Addendum A. Counsel for Madson scheduled the depositions of 
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Williams and her husband for December 6 and 7 , 2006. Just days before those 
scheduled depositions, counsel for Williams filed a motion to disqualify Ronald R. 
Madson as counsel for Madson. Said motion was filed on November 21, 2006—one year 
and three months after Ronald R. Madson appeared as counsel for Mr. Madson. See 
Addendum 1. The hearing as to Williams' motion to disqualify Madson's counsel was 
heard before the Commissioner on January 3, 2007. See Addendum C. 
Madson timely filed his objection to said ruling by the Commissioner on January 
10, 2007 and on April 2, 2007, the Honorable Fred D. Howard heard said objection and 
specifically ruled that Madson's counsel was reinstated as counsel in all capacities except 
as trial counsel. See Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties herein were divorced on January 5, 2005. On September 2, 2005, the 
Petitioner/Appellee (Williams) filed a Petition with this court seeking to modify the 
decree of divorce. The Respondent/Appellant (Madson) retained as his counsel Ronald 
R. Madson who filed an Answer to the Petition in September of 2005 and as the file 
reflects, for the next one year and three month the parties engaged in extensive litigation 
and discovery. See Addendum A. Counsel for Madson scheduled the depositions of 
Williams and her husband for December 6 and 7 , 2006. Just days before those 
scheduled depositions, counsel for Williams filed a motion to disqualify Ronald R. 
Madson as counsel for Madson. Said motion was filed on November 21, 2006—one year 
and three months after Ronald R. Madson appeared as counsel for Mr. Madson. See 
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Addendum A. The hearing as to Williams' motion to disqualify Madson's counsel was 
heard before the Commissioner on January 3, 2007. The findings of the Commissioner at 
said hearing are attached hereto as Addendum C. In short, the Commissioner found: 
1. That URPC 3.7 could be expanded to include disqualification of a 
counsel prior to trial as well as being an "advocate at trial." Paragraph 5, 
Addendum C. 
2. That while any affidavits or involvement by counsel for Madson prior to 
the motion to disqualify would not be a sufficient basis to disqualify him 
as counsel in this case, the categorical denial of said counsel as to the 
falsity of the statements made by Williams in her efforts to disqualify 
him as counsel (16 months after the counsel had been representing 
Madson) made said counsel a witness as to the "whether or not 
Petitioner is telling the truth," See Addendum C. 
Madson timely filed his objection to said ruling by the Commissioner on January 
10, 2007 and on April 2, 2007, the Honorable Fred Howard heard said objection and 
specifically ruled, 
"Excepting the ruling prohibiting Mr. Ronald R. Madson in appearing as 
counsel at trial, the Respondent's Objection to the Commissioner's 
recommendations are sustained and Mr. Ronald R. Madson may, in all other 
capacities, act as counsel for the Respondent. " See Addendum B. 
In making said ruling said Court specifically found: 
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1. "It was over sixteen (16) months after learning of a potential problem 
or conflict before Petitioner filed her Motion to Disqualify. " Paragraph 
A, Addendum B. 
2. "Thereby, Petitioner failed to "immediately file" and "diligently 
pursue " her request for disqualification of Mr. Ronald R. Madson. " 
Paragraph B, Addendum B. 
3. "Requiring Mr. Ronald R. Madson to withdraw would cause a "serious 
hardship on Respondent and would, thereby, cause serious prejudice to 
the Respondent. "Paragraph C, Addendum B. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
It is reversible error, as a matter of current Utah law, to disqualify a party's 
counsel when the party seeking the disqualification knew of the potential problem or 
conflict for sixteen (16) months before bringing a motion to disqualify said counsel and 
failed to "immediately file" and "diligently pursue" her case. 
It is also reversible error, as a matter of current Utah law, to disqualify a party's 
counsel under URPC 3.7 when requiring counsel to withdraw would cause a "serious 
hardship" to respondent and would, thereby, cause serious prejudice to the Respondent. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE LAW ON DISQUALIFICATION OF COUNSEL AS TO TIMELINESS 
There are two cases that previously came before this Court that answered this 
issue now before the Court, namely, Zions First National Bank v. Barbara Jensen 
Interiors, Inc.,lU P.2d 478 (Utah App. 1989) (hereinafter referred to as "Zions") and 
D.J. Investment Group, LLC v. Dae/Westbrook LLC, 113 P3d 1022 (Utah App. 2005) 
(hereinafter referred to as "DJ") and affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court in D.J. 
Investment, LLC v. Dae/Westbrook, LLC 147 P3d 414 (Utah 2006) (referred to as DJ2). 
See Addendum E. 
In Zions, the Defendants brought a motion to disqualify opposing counsel seven 
months after the opposing party's counsel had appeared in the case and only three months 
after said Defendants claimed to have first learned of the basis for the motion and only 
one day before a scheduled hearing. Quoting from Zions this court expressed its position 
as to the consequences of a party bringing an "untimely" motion to disqualify an 
opposing counsel: 
"A motion to disqualify counsel must be immediately filed and diligently pursued 
as soon as the party becomes aware of the basis for disqualification, and it may not be 
used as a manipulative litigation tactic. See, e.g. Smith v. Whatcott, 757 F. 2d 1098, 
1099-1100 (10th Cir. 1985: Redd v. Shell Oil Co., 518 F. 2d 31L 315 (l(fh Cir. 1975); 
Margulies v. Unchurch. 696 P. 2d 1195, 1202 (Utah 1985). The district court held the 
Jensen's motion to be untimely because it was fled nearly seven months after Ray, 
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Quinney, & Nebeker appeared as Zion 's counsel, and more than three months after the 
February 10 settlement negotiations. " Zions First National Bank v. Barbara Jensen 
Interiors, Inc.,lU P.2d478, 480-81 (Utah App. 1989). 
Seventeen years after the Zions decision was handed down, this court once again 
addressed the same issues raised in Zions in the ZXfcase, supra. A party brought a motion 
to disqualify opposing counsel. The district court judge had found that uthe parties were 
aware that Snuffer (the counsel they sought to disqualify^ would likely be a necessary 
witness at least three months prior to fling their motion, if not earlier. " D.J. Investment 
Group, LLC v. Dae/Westbrook LLC, 113 P3d 1022, 1024 (Utah App. 2005).Having made 
that determination, this court, citing Zions, affirmed the trial court's decision to not 
exclude Snuffer as counsel at trial: 
i(The trial court also found that Westbrook filed its motion in an untimely 
manner. We agree. A motion to disqualify counsel is untimely when it is not 
'immediately filed and diligently pursued as soon as the party becomes aware of 
the basis for disqualification' Zions First Nat 7 Bank v. Barbara Jensen Interiors, 
Inc., supra." D.J. Investment Group, LLC v. Dae/Westbrook LLC, 113 P3d 1022, 
1024 (Utah App. 2005). 
This court further confirmed that at the time of the filing of the lawsuit both 
parties were aware of Snuffer's participation in the matter at hand and that the purpose of 
URPC 3.7 is primarily a u call for self governance....is designed to provide guidance to 
lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary 
agencies.... and the purposes of the rules can be subverted when they are invoked by 
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opposing parties as procedural weapons. " D.J. Investment Group, LLC v. 
Dae/WestbrookLLC, 113 P3d 1022, 1023 (Utah App. 2005). 
II. THE MOTION TO DISQUALIFY WAS UNTIMELY AND COUNSEL 
SHOULD BE REINSTATED FOR TRIAL 
The District Court Judge, Fred Howard, specifically found that Williams, after 
learning of a potential problem or conflict as to Madson's counsel, waited over sixteen 
months before filing her motion to disqualify said counsel, ((It was over sixteen (16) 
months after learning of a potential problem or conflict before Petitioner filed her 
Motion to Disqualify. " See Paragraph A, Addendum B. 
The court further found that Williams failed to "immediately file" and "diligently 
pursue" her request seeking the disqualification of opposing counsel, "Thereby, 
Petitioner failed to u immediately file " and "diligently pursue " her request for 
disqualification of Mr. Ronald R. Madson. " See Paragraph B Addendum B. 
As this Court found in DJ, if a motion to disqualify is not immediately filed or 
diligently pursued it is not timely, "A motion to disqualify counsel is untimely when it is 
not 'immediately filed and diligently pursued as soon as the party becomes aware of the 
basis for disqualification' Zions First Nat 7 Bank v. Barbara Jensen Interiors, Inc., 
supra" D.J Investment Group, LLC v. Dae/WestbrookLLC, 113 P3d 1022, 1024 (Utah 
App. 2005). 
Therefore, as a matter of law the motion to disqualify counsel for Mr. Madson is 
not timely and for this reason is correctible error and should be reversed. 
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III. THE DISQUALIFICATION OF COUNSEL UNDER URCP 3.7 IS 
CORRECTIBLE ERROR BECAUSE SUCH DISQUALIFICATION WOULD 
WORK A SUBSTANTIAL HARDSHIP OF THE CLIENT 
The court also found that to require the Madson's counsel be disqualified after such a 
delay would cause a "serious hardship" and "serious prejudice" to Mr. Madson. Rule 3.7 
provides that "A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to 
be a necessary witness. " See Addendum D. The Rule, however, provides for an 
exception when "disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the 
client. " In this matter before the court, the District Court judge specifically found that 
"Requiring Mr. Ronald R. Madson to withdraw would cause a "serious hardship on 
Respondent and would, thereby, cause serious prejudice to the Respondent. "Paragraph C, 
Addendum B. 
Based upon Rule 3.7, this finding is a clear exception to the rule that a lawyer 
should be disqualified when he is likely to be a necessary witness. Therefore, the decision 
to disqualify Madson's counsel is reversible error. 
IV. REQUEST TO REMAND AND AWARD ATTORNEY FEES 
If this court reverses the District Court's decision that bars Mr. Madson' counsel 
from representing his client at trial, then this Appellant/Respondent is further requesting 
that this Court direct the District Court to hold a hearing to consider awarding Madson 
his attorney fees and costs in having to defend himself from what this appellant considers 
an extremely manipulative litigation tactic that was brought in bad faith by Williams and 
her counsel. 
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The District Court Judge need not make any determination at this time as to the 
veracity or falseness of the allegations made by Williams in her motion(s) to have Mr. 
Madson's counsel disqualified in order to make a determination that the timing and the 
nature of the allegations independently demonstrate the motion was brought in bad faith 
and for purposes for which it was not intended. 
A careful reading of the Motion to Disqualify and the Response to the same 
reveals: 
1. That Williams and her counsel knew fully of the matters which they alleged 
were the basis for disqualifying Madson's counsel even prior to filing their original 
complaint with this court; 
2. That Williams and her counsel allowed Madson's counsel to represent him in a 
very litigious case for over sixteen months before bringing the Motion to Disqualify his 
counsel; 
3. That Williams through counsel persistently and in bad faith asserted procedural 
tactics to prevent any depositions being taken by Madson from August of 2006 through 
October of 2006. Then in November of2006, Williams filed a motion to disqualify 
Madson's counsel which motion was incrementally amended to add new allegations as to 
matters that occurred well before this present litigation ever commenced—all in an effort 
to derail any depositions from occurring in this case. 
4. That if the district court is allowed to examine the allegations made for the 
basis of the motion to disqualify, then this appellant contends that not only will the court 
find that they allegations were matters that were known prior to the litigation 
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commencing, but that the allegations were false and fabricated and presented to the court 
in such a way to intentionally deceive this court. 
For the reasons above, if this court rules, as a matter of law, that given the findings 
of this court William's motion to disqualify Madson's counsel at trial should be reversed, 
then this Appellant is further requesting that this Court instruct the district court judge to 
hold a hearing to consider whether the Appellant should be awarded attorney fees and 
costs in having to overcome a motion to disqualify that Madson argues was brought in 
bad faith under the circumstances. 
CONCLUSION 
Utah Law is clear that when a motion to disqualify is not immediately filed and 
diligently pursued then it is not timely and fails. Furthermore, even when such motion is 
timely, serious hardship is an exception to Rule 3.7. After a hearing, Judge Howard 
specifically found: 
1. "It was over sixteen (16) months after learning of a potential problem 
or conflict before Petitioner filed her Motion to Disqualify. " Paragraph 
A, Addendum B. 
2. "Thereby, Petitioner failed to "immediately file" and "diligently 
pursue " her request for disqualification of Mr. Ronald R. Madson. " 
Paragraph B Addendum B. 
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3. "Requiring Mr. Ronald R. Madson to withdraw would cause a ((serious 
hardship on Respondent and would, thereby, cause serious prejudice to 
the Respondent. " Paragraph C, Addendum B. 
These are the only factual findings in the court below that are before this court. 
Based on said findings the court below properly reinstated counsel for Madson, but chose 
to prevent his counsel from representing him at trial. Madson brings this Appeal arguing 
that based on those findings of fact, the precedence of Utah case law, common sense, 
justice and equity, his counsel should not, after having now represented him for twenty-
one (21) months and counting, be disqualified as his trial counsel if in fact this case 
proceeds to trial. Judge Howards decision to disqualify Madson's counsel is clear error 
given the that the Motion to Disqualify was untimely and even if timely would impose a 
substantial hardship on the client thus falling in the exception clause to Rule 3.7. 
Moreover, this appellant, if successful, is further requesting that this court 
specifically remand this matter to the District Court Judge to determine if under the 
circumstances the appellant should be awarded his costs and attorney fees in having to 
overcome a motion he contends was brought in bad faith. 
Dated this ^ d a y of December, 2007 _ _ ^ 
Ronald R. Madson, Esq. 
Attorney for Respondent/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ) j£-day of December, 2007, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing AMENDED BRIEF OF APPELLANT, was mailed, first class postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
Rosemond Blakelock, Esq. 
75 South 300 West 
Provo,Utah 84601 
Ronald R. Madson, Esq. 
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ADDENDUM A 
Court Docket 
Fage I ot 11 
4TE DISTRICT COURT - PROVO 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WHITNEY WILLIAMS vs. JOSHUA DANIEL MADSON 
CASE NUMBER 04 4 4 00031 Divorce/Annulment 
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
FRED D HOWARD 
Division 5 
CURRENT ASSIGNED COMMISSIONER 
THOMAS PATTON 
PARTIES 
Petitioner - WHITNEY WILLIAMS 
Represented by: ROSEMOND V BLAKELOCK 
Respondent - JOSHUA DANIEL MADSON 
Represented by: RONALD D WILKINSON 
Represented by: RONALD R MADSON 
ACCOUNT SUMMARY 
TOTAL REVENUE Amount Due: 231.75 
Amount Paid: 231.75 
^Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: DIVORCE PETN 
Amount Due: 95.00 
Amount Paid: 95.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: VITAL STATISTICS FEE 
Amount Due: 2.00 
Amount Paid: 2.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE 
Amount Due: 2.00 
Amount Paid: 2.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
^thn-//Y^hanapiitnoi]rts.gov/casesearch/CaseSearch?action=cawSeHist 10/8/2007 
CASE NUMBER 044400031 Divorce/Annulment 
rage J 01zz 
Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Amount Credit: 
Balance: 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE 
Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Amount Credit: 
Balance: 
5.00 
5.00 
0,00 
0.00 
4.75 
4.75 
0.00 
0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: AUDIO TAPE COPY 
Amount Due: 10.00 
Amount Paid: 10.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: AUDIO TAPE COPY 
Amount Due: 10.00 
Amount Paid: 10.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE; COPY FEE 
Amount Due: 0.75 
Amount Paid: 0.75 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: AUDIO TAPE COPY 
Amount Due: 10.00 
Amount Paid: 10.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE 
Amount D u e : 1 . 5 0 
Amount P a i d : 1 . 5 0 
Amount C r e d i t : 0 . 0 0 
B a l a n c e : 0 . 0 0 
CASE NOTE 
PROCEEDINGS 
0 1 - 0 6 - 0 4 F i l e d : A f f i d a v i t 
0 1 - 0 7 - 0 4 C o m m i s s i o n e r THOMAS PATTON a s s i g n e d . 
0 1 - 0 7 - 0 4 F i l e d : C o m p l a i n t 
P r i n t e d : 1 0 / 0 8 / 0 7 1 4 : 1 9 : 4 5 P a g e 3 
httrW/Yr.h?mcre ntr,oiirtR.Pov/casesearch/CaseSearch?action=caseHist 10/8/2007 
Paee 2 ot22 
Printed: 10/08/07 14:19:45 Page 1 
CASE NUMBER 044400031 Divorce/Annulment 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE 
Amount Due: 2.00 
Amount Paid: 2.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: DIVORCE MODIFICATION 
Amount Due: 4 0 .00 
Amount P a i d : 4 0 .00 
Amount C r e d i t : 0 .00 
B a l a n c e : 0 .00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE 
Amount Due: 6.75 
Amount Paid: 6.75 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: AUDIO TAPE COPY 
Amount Due: 10.00 
Amount P a i d : 10 .00 
Amount C r e d i t : 0 .00 
B a l a n c e : 0 .00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: AUDIO TAPE COPY 
Amount Due: 10.00 
Amount Paid: 10.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: AUDIO TAPE COPY 
Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Amount Credit: 
Balance: 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE 
Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Amount Credit: 
Balance: 
10.00 
10.00 
0.00 
0.00 
2.00 
2.00 
0.00 
0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: AUDIO TAPE COPY 
Amount Due: 10.00 
Amount Paid: 10,00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: MISCELLANEOUS FEE 
P r i n t e d : 1 0 / 0 8 / 0 7 1 4 : 1 9 : 4 5 Page 2 
h11rr//xr;hflnfre_iitcoi]r^^ 10/8/2007 
rage 4 01 n 
CASE NUMBER 04 4 4 00031 Divorce/Annulment 
01-07-04 Fee Account created Total Due: 95.00 
01-07-04 Fee Account created Total Due: 2.00 
01-07-04 DIVORCE PETN Payment Received: 95.00 
Note: Code Description: DIVORCE PETN; Code Description: 
VITAL STATISTICS FEE 
01-07-04 VITAL STATISTICS FEE Payment Received: 2.00 
01-07-04 Filed: Affidavit of Whitney Williams 
01-07-04 Filed: Motion for Order to Show Cause 
01-07-04 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE scheduled on January 15, 2004 at 09:00 AM 
in Second Floor, Rm 202 with Commissioner PATTON. 
01-08-04 Issued: Order to Show Cause 
Judge FRED D HOWARD 
Hearing Date: January 15, 2004 Time: 09:00 
01-13-04 Filed return: Order to Show Cause 
Party Served: MADSON, JOSHUA DANIEL 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: January 12, 2004 
01-13-04 Filed: Certificate of Service 
01-13-04 Filed: Affidavit of Joshua Aker 
01-13-04 Filed: Affidavit of Ronald R Madson 
01-13-04 Filed: Affidavit of Robyn Williams 
01-13-04 Filed: Affidavit of Cynthia Connin 
01-13-04 Filed: Affidavit of Nicole Bird 
01-14-04 Filed: Affidavit of Joshua Daniel Madson 
01-14-04 Filed: Counter Affidavit of Joshua Daniel Madson 
01-14-04 Filed: Certificate of Service 
01-15-04 Filed return: Summons 
Party Served: MADSON, JOSHUA DANIEL 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: January 12, 2004 
01-15-04 REVIEW HEARING scheduled on January 30, 2004 at 02:00 PM in 
Second Floor, Rm 202 with Commissioner PATTON. 
01-15-04 Minute Entry - Minutes for Order to Show Cause 
Commissioner: THOMAS PATTON 
Clerk: leilanip 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff(s): WHITNEY WILLIAMS 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): ROSEMOND BLAKELOCK 
Attorney for the Respondent: J GRANT MOODY 
Respondent(s): JOSHUA DANIEL MADSON 
Video 
Tape Number: 04 6004 Tape Count: 094 4 
HEARING 
Ms. Blakelock addresses the Court. 
Printed: 10/08/07 14:19:45 Page 4 
CASE NUMBER 044400031 Divorce/Annulment 
httn://xchange.utcourts.gov/casesearch/CaseSearch?action=:caseHist 10/8/2007 
Mr. Moody requests more time to speak with Counsel and the 
Parties. 
The Court holds an in-chambers conference with Counsel. 
COUNT: 1047 
The Court resumes session with all Parties present and ready to 
proceed. The Court reviews the content of the in-chambers 
conference. 
Ms. Blakelock addresses the Court stating the stipulation of the 
Parties. The Parties agree to the stipulation. 
The Court approves the stipulation as presented and schedules this 
matter for review. 
REVIEW HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 01/30/2004 
Time: 02:00 p.m. 
Location: Second Floor, Rm 202 
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT 
125 N 100 W 
PROVO, UT 8 4 601 
Before Commissioner: THOMAS PATTON 
01-30-04 Minute Entry - Minutes for Review Hearing 
Commissioner: THOMAS PATTON 
Clerk: joyc 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff(s): WHITNEY WILLIAMS 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): ROSEMOND BLAKELOCK 
Attorney for the Respondent: J GRANT MOODY 
Respondent(s): JOSHUA DANIEL MADSON 
Video 
Tape Number: 036007 Tape Count: 2:12 
HEARING 
Ms, Blakelock addresses the Court and states the parties have 
reached a written stipulation. The parties also agree that, if 
necessary, they both are willing to attend mediation. 
Both parties accept, agree and are bound by the written in 
stipulation in open court. 
Ms. Blakelock to prepare the order. 
01-30-04 Filed: Stipulation in re: Temporary Orders 
02-26-04 Filed order: Order On Stipulation In RE: January 30, 2004 
Hearing 
Judge FRED D HOWARD 
Signed February 26, 2004 
02-27-04 Filed: Notice of Entry of Order on Stipulation in re: January 
30, 2004 Hearing 
10-18-04 Filed: Affidavit Of Jurisdiction And Grounds 
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10-18-04 Filed: Certificate of Completion for Divorce Education Program 
(Whitney Williams 6/9/04) 
10-18-04 Filed: Child Support Obligation Worksheet Required Location 
Information (Filed) 
11-03-04 Judge GARY D STOTT assigned. 
11-05-04 Filed: Certificate of Completion of Shared Parenting Course for 
Divorcing Parents (Joshua) 
11-09-04 Filed order: MINUTE ENTRY (return of unsigned decree and 
findings of fact and conclusions of law with Rosemond 
Blakelock, ATP, copy of minute entry) 
Judge GARY D STOTT 
Signed November 09, 2004 
11-15-04 Filed: Stipulation 
12-21-04 Filed: Stipulation to Enter Decree Nunc Pro Tunc 
12-21-04 Filed: Motion for Order Nunc Pro Tunc 
12-30-04 Filed order: Order Granting Motion to Enter Decree Nunc Pro 
Tunc 
Judge GARY D STOTT 
Signed December 30, 2004 
12-31-04 Judge ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD assigned. 
01-06-05 Filed: Notice of Entry of Order Granting Motion to Enter Decree 
Nunc Pro Tunc 
01-12-05 Filed order: Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Judge ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD 
Signed January 12, 2005 
01-20-05 Judgment #1 Entered 
01-20-05 Filed judgment: Decree of Divorce 
Judge ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD 
Signed January 12, 2005 
01-20-05 Case Disposition is Judgment 
Disposition Judge is ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD 
01-24-05 Note: Certificate of Divorce sent to the Bureau of Vital 
Records 
02-01-05 Filed: Notice of Entry of Decree of Divorce and the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law 
05-02-05 Fee Account created Total Due: 2.00 
05-02-05 COPY FEE Payment Received: 2.00 
Note: 029 
08-2 6-05 Fee Account created Total Due: 2.00 
08-26-05 COPY FEE Paymenb Received: 2.00 
09-02-05 Filed: Verified Complaint for Modification of Decree of Divorce 
in re: Custody 
09-02-05 Fee Account created Total Due: 4 0.00 
09-02-05 DIVORCE MODIFICATION Payment Received: 40.00 
Note: Code Description: DIVORCE MODIFICATION 
09-13-05 Filed return: Constable's Proof Of Service (On Summons) 
Party Served: MADSON, JOSHUA DANIEL 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: September 07, 2005 
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09-26-05 Filed: Answer to Verified Complaint for Modification of Decree 
of Divorce and Request for Attorney Fees 
JOSHUA DANIEL MADSON 
September 26, 2005 
09-30-05 Fee Account created Total Due: 6.75 
09-30-05 COPY FEE Payment Received: 6.75 
Note: 7.00 cash tendered. 
10-25-05 Filed: Motion in Support of Order for Custody Evaluator 
Filed by: BLAKELOCK, ROSEMOND 
11-07-05 Filed: Memorandum In Objection To Motion In Support Of Order 
For Custody Evaluation 
11-07-05 Filed: Affidavit Of Joshua Daniel Madson 
11-10-05 Filed: Request Eor Oral Arguments, In Re: Motion In Support Of 
Order For Custody Evaluator 
11-16-05 Filed: Motion To Dismiss Or In The Alternative Motion For 
Summary Judgment Or In The Alternative Motion To Stay Until 
Petitioner Proves Substantial Change In Circumstances 
11-16-05 Filed: Ex Parte Request For Over-Length Brief 
12-05-05 Filed: Response to Motion to Dismiss 
12-05-05 SCHELDING CONFERENCE scheduled on January 03, 2006 at 10:00 AM 
in Third floor, Rm 303 with Commissioner PATTON. 
12-05-05 Notice - NOTICE for Case 044400031 ID 9214917 
SCHELDING CONFERENCE is scheduled. 
Date: 01/03/2006 
Time: 10:00 a.m. 
Location: Third floor, Rm 303 
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT 
125 N 100 W 
PROVO, UT 84 601 
Before Commissioner: THOMAS PATTON 
12-05-05 Notice - NOTICE for Case 044400031 ID 9214928 
SCHELDING CONFERENCE is scheduled. 
Date: 1/3/2006 
Time: 10:00 a.m. 
Location: Third floor, Rm 303 
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT 
125 N 100 W 
PROVO, UT 84 601 
Before Commissioner: THOMAS PATTON 
All parties and their counsel are required to attend. Failure to 
appear may result in a default being entered and judgment being 
granted. 
Failure to appear at Pretrial may result in the Court striking your 
pleadings and entering judgment by default. 
12-05-05 SCHELDING CONFERENCE scheduled on January 03, 2006 at 10:00 AM 
in Third floor, Rm 303 with Commissioner PATTON, 
12-05-05 SCHELDING CONFERENCE Cancelled. 
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12-05-05 Notice - NOTICE for Case 044400031 ID 9214945 
SCDING CONF & ORAL ARGUMENT. 
Date: 01/05/2006 
Time: 10:00 a.m. 
Location: Third floor, Rm 303 
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT 
125 N 100 W 
PROVO, UT 84 601 
Before Commissioner: THOMAS PATTON 
The reason for the change is Counsel's request. 
All parties and their counsel are required to attend. Failure to 
appear may result in a default being entered and judgment being 
granted. 
12-05-05 SCDING CONF & ORAL ARGUMENT rescheduled on January 05, 2006 at 
10:00 AM Reason: Counsel's request.. 
12-05-05 Filed: Request for Oral Arguments in Re: Motion to Dismiss 
Motion for Summary Judgment or in the Alternative Motion to 
Stay 
12-13-05 Filed: Reply to Petitioner's Opposition to Motion to Dismiss 
12-28-05 Filed: Answer to Respondent's First Request for Admissions 
WHITNEY WILLIAMS 
December 28, 2005 
12-30-05 SCDING CONF & ORAL ARGUMENT scheduled on January 10, 2006 at 
02:00 PM in Third floor, Rm 303 with Commissioner PATTON. 
01-09-06 ORAL ARGUMENT scheduled on January 10, 2006 at 02:00 PM in 
Fourth floor, Rm 401 with Judge SCHOFIELD. 
01-10-06 Minute Entry - Minutes for ORAL ARGUMENT 
Judge: ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD 
Clerk: jennyc 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff(s): WHITNEY WILLIAMS 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): ROSEMOND V BLAKELOCK 
Attorney for the Respondent: RONALD R MADSON 
Respondent(s): JOSHUA DANIEL MADSON 
Audio 
Tape Number: 06-03 401 Tape Count: 2:47-3:37 
HEARING 
COUNT: 2:47 
This matter comes before the court for oral argument. Mr. Madson 
addresses his motion, Ms. Blakelock addresses. Mr, Madson 
responds. 
COUNT: 3:14 
Court is in recess. 
Printed: 10/08/07 14:19:47 Page 8 
CASE NUMBER 044400031 Divorce/Annulment 
COUNT: 3:29 
Court reconvenes. The petition is dismissed. An amended petition 
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may be filed within 30 days. Mr. Madson will prepare an 
appropriate order. 
01-10-0 6 Minute Entry - Minutes for SCHED CONF/ORAL ARG 
Commissioner: THOMAS PATTON 
Clerk: robynk 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): ROSEMOND V BLAKELOCK 
Audio 
Tape Number: 05 4 0 303 Tape Count: 3:47-3:49 
HEARING 
TAPE: 05 40 303 COUNT: 3:47-3:49 
Ms Blakelock appears in the courtroom and states that matters have 
been resolved, regarding the Scheduling Conference and Oral 
Arguments, before Judge Schofield. The court strikes this matter 
from today's calendar. 
01-12-06 Fee Account created Total Due: 10.00 
01-12-06 AUDIO TAPE COPY Payment Received: 10.00 
Note: #008 
01-13-06 Filed: Request for Video/Audio Record 
01-17-06 Filed: Proposed Order Certificate of Mailing 
01-25-06 Filed return: Certificate of Service by Mail (Amended Verified 
Complain for Modification of Decree of Divorce in re: Custody) 
Party Served: MADSON, JOSHUA DANIEL 
Service Type: Mail 
Service Date: January 24, 2006 
01-25-06 Filed: Amended Verified Complain for Modification of Decree of 
Divorce in re: Custody 
01-31-0 6 Filed order: Order 
Judge ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD 
Signed January 31, 2006 
02-06-06 Filed return: Constable's Proof Of Service (For Subpoena Duces 
Tecum) 
Party Served: Provo Police 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: January 05, 2006 
02-06-06 Filed: Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Motion to Stay 
Until Petitioner Proves Substantial Change of Circumstances and 
Request for Attorney Fees 
02-06-06 Filed: Request for Oral Arguments, in Re: Motion to Dismiss or 
in the Alternative Motion to Stay 
02-09-06 Filed: Answers to Respondent's First Request for Admissions to 
Petitioner 
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Request For Oral Arguments On Request For Custody Evaluator 
02-14-06 Notice - NOTICE for Case 044400031 ID 9264899 
ORAL ARGUMENT is scheduled. 
Date: 03/17/2006 
Time: 10:45 a.m. 
Location: Fourth floor, Rm 401 
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT 
125 N 100 W 
PROVO, UT 8 4 601 
Before Judge: ANTHONY W. SCHOF1ELD 
This matter is being scheduled for 45 minute oral arguments at the 
request of Mr. Madson. 
02-14-06 ORAL ARGUMENT scheduled on March 17, 2006 at 10:45 AM in Fourth 
floor, Rm 4 01 with Judge SCHOFIELD. 
02-23-06 Filed: Reply to Petitioner's Opposition to Motion to Dismiss 
03-14-06 Filed return: Certificate of Mailing 
Party Served: Ronald Madsen 
Service Type: Mail 
Service Date: March 09, 2006 
03-14-06 Filed return: Certificate of Mailing 
Party Served: Clark Session 
Service Type: Mail 
Service Date: March 09, 2006 
03-17-06 Fee Account created Total Due: 10.00 
03-17-06 AUDIO TAPE COPY Payment Received: 10.00 
03-17-06 Judge FRED D HOWARD assigned. 
03-17-06 Filed: Minute Entry- Recusal 
03-17-06 Minute Entry - Minutes for ORAL ARGUMENT 
Commissioner: 
03-20-06 Filed return: Amended Certificate of Mailing of Petitioner's 
Answers to Respondent's First Bequest for Production of 
Documents 
Party Served: Ronald Madson 
Service Type: Mail 
Service Date: March 17, 2006 
03-20-06 Filed: Faxed Letter from Ronald Madson 
03-22-06 Filed: Tape Request Completed 
03-22-06 Fee Account created Total Due: 10.00 
03-22-06 AUDIO TAPE COPY Payment Received: 10.00 
Note: #019 
03-27-06 Filed: Motion for Clarification and Motion to Amend 
04-10-06 Filed: Response to Motion for Clarification and Motion to Amend 
04-10-06 Filed: Notice to Submit on Motion for Custody Evaluator 
04-11-06 Notice - NOTICE for Case 044400031 ID 9307634 
ORAL ARGUMENT is scheduled. 
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125 N 100 W 
PROVO, UT 8 4 601 
Before Judge: FRED D HOWARD 
The Court has set aside one (1) hour to hear oral argument on the 
following motions: 
1. Respondent's Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Motion to 
Stay Until Petitioner Proves Substantial Change of Circumstances 
and Request for Attorney Fees 
2. Respondent's Motion for Clarification and Motion to Amend 
3. Petitioner's Motoin for Custody Evaluator 
04-11-06 ORAL ARGUMENT scheduled on June 07, 200 6 at 02:30 PM in Second 
Floor, Rm 202 with Judge HOWARD. 
04-19-06 Filed: Response to Notice to Submit on MOoion for Custody 
Evaluator 
0 6-07-06 Minute Entry - Minutes for ORAL ARGUMENT 
Judge: FRED D HOWARD 
Clerk: sherylc 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): ROSEMOND V BLAKELOCK 
Attorney for the Respondent: RONALD R MADSON 
Respondent(s): JOSHUA DANIEL MADSON 
Audio 
Tape Number: 06-10-202 Tape Count: 2:37-3:30 
HEARING 
TAPE: 06-10-202 COUNT: 2:37-3:30 
Mr. Joshua Madson appears. Counsel make their appearance and give 
arguments on the motions before the court. Counsel submit. 
The court finds as stated. Motion For Clarification & Motion To 
Amend - The court cannot clarifiy. Motion In Support Of Custody 
Evaluator - The court advises and encourages to mediate. Motion To 
Dismiss - denied. 
Ms. Blakelock is to prepare the Order (court states that Legal 
Standard, in not addressed at this time and is reserved) 
06-09-06 Filed: Request for Rehearing and Reconsideration of Motion to 
Dismiss & Request for Specific Findings as to Motion [to] 
Dismiss 
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06-20-06 Filed: Motion to Compel Discovery & Motion for Evidentiary 
Ruling 
07-20-06 Filed: Request for Oral Arguments in Re Motion to Compel and 
Motion for Evidentiary Ruling 
08-01-06 Filed: Notice to Submit for Decision in Re: Motion for 
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Rehearing of Motion to Dismiss & Moiton for Specific Findings 
08-01-06 Filed: Notice to Submit for Decision in Re: Motion to Compel 
Discovery & Motion for Evidentiary Ruling 
08-03-06 Filed: Objection to Notice to Submit and Objection to Motion to 
Compel Discovery 
08-07-06 Filed: Reply to Objection to Notice to Submit and Motion to 
Compel 
08-08-06 Filed: Motion To Continue Depositions Of Ned Williams And Robyn 
Williams 
08-14-06 Filed: Opposition to Motion to Continue 
08-16-06 Notice - NOTICE for Case 044400031 ID 9402549 
TELEPHONE CONFERENCE is scheduled. 
Date: 09/01/2006 
Time: 12:00 p.m. 
Location: Second Floor, Rm 202 
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT 
125 N 100 W 
PROVO, UT 84 601 
Before Judge: FRED D HOWARD 
The Court has set aside 15 minutes to discuss the status of 
Respondents Motion to Compel Discovery. The court cleric will 
initiate the call. 
08-16-06 TELEPHONE CONFERENCE scheduled on September 01, 2006 at 12:00 
PM in Second Floor, Rm 202 with Judge HOWARD. 
08-18-06 Filed return: Certificate of Service by Mail 
Party Served: Ronald Madsen 
Service Type: Mail 
Service Date: August 18, 2006 
08-21-06 Filed: Supplemental Response to Interrogatories and Request for 
Production of Documents 
08-24-06 Filed order: Ruling Re: Motion to Compel [granted] and for 
Evidentiary Hearing [denied] 
Judge FRED D HOWARD 
Signed August 24, 2006 
08-24-06 Filed order: Ruling Re: Request for Rehearing and 
Reconsideration of Motion to Dismiss [denied] 
Judge FRED D HOWARD 
Signed August 24, 2006 
09-01-06 Minute Entry - Minutes for TELEPHONE CONFERENCE 
Judge: FRED D HOWARD 
Clerk: miket 
TELEPHONE CONFERENCE 
PRESENT 
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Plaintiff's Attorney(s): ROSEMOND V BLAKELOCK 
Attorney for the Respondent: RONALD R MADSON 
Audio 
Tape Number: 06-14-202 Tape Count: 12:18-12:23 
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HEARING 
Counsel address the Court as to the award of attorney's fees as 
related to Respondent's Motion to Compel. The Court defers all 
awards of attorney's fees until the completion of the case. 
09-12-06 Filed order: Ruling Re: Lack of Mailing Certificate 
Judge FRED D HOWARD 
Signed September 12, 2006 
10-02-06 Filed order: Order 
Judge FRED D HOWARD 
Signed September 29, 2006 
10-27-06 Filed: Affidavit of Emily B Rowley 
11-01-06 Fee Account created Total Due: 2.00 
11-01-06 COPY FEE Payment Received: 2.00 
11-21-06 Filed: Motion to Disqualify Ronald R. Madson as Counsel for 
Respondent and Motion to Stay All Proceedings Until A Ruling is 
Issued Regarding the Motion Disqualify 
11-21-06 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Motion to Disqualify R. Madson 
as Counsel for Respondent and Motion to Stay All Proceedings 
Until a Ruling is Issued Regarding the Motion Disqualify 
11-30-06 Filed: Respondent's Rule 26 (a) Initial Disclosures 
11-30-06 Filed: Opposition To Petitioner's Motion To Disqualify Counsel 
and Motion To Stay Proceedings & Respondent's Countermotion For 
Entry Of Discovery Order Pursuant to URCP 26(f)(3) & 
Alternatively Request For Scheduling & Management Conference 
12-04-06 Filed: Request for Phone Conference, In Re: Motion to Strike 
Depositions and Motion for Expedited Ruling 
12-04-06 Filed: Motion to Strike Depositions and Motion for Expedited 
Ruling 
12-05-06 ORAL ARGUMENT scheduled on December 06, 2006 at 10:00 AM in 
Third floor, Rm 303 with Commissioner PATTON. 
12-05-0 6 Minute Entry - Minutes for TELEPHONE CONFERENCE 
Commissioner: THOMAS PATTON 
Clerk: emilyp 
TELEPHONE CONFERENCE 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): ROSEMOND V BLAKELOCK 
Attorney for the Respondent: RONALD R MADSON 
Audio 
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at 10:00 a.m. on December 6, 2006. 
The Court reserves the Respondent's fees and costs at this time. 
Both counsel should come prepared to argue the Motion to Disqualify 
and then the Motion to Strike Depositions. 
ORAL ARGUMENT is scheduled. 
Date: 12/06/2006 
Time: 10:00 a.m. 
Location: Third floor, Rm 303 
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT 
125 N 100 W 
PROVO, UT 84 601 
Before Commissioner: THOMAS PATTON 
12-05-06 Filed: Second Request for Expedited Telephone Conference in Re 
Motion to Strike Depositions and Motion for Expedited Ruling 
12-06-06 MTN TO DISQUALIFY ORAL ARG scheduled on January 03, 2007 at 
02:00 PM in Third floor, Rm 303 with Commissioner PATTON. 
12-06-06 TELEPHONE CONF/ DEPOSITIONS T scheduled on January 04, 2007 at 
11:00 AM in Third floor, Rm 303 with Commissioner PATTON. 
12-06-06 PHONE CONF/ DEPOSITIONS STAT scheduled on January 10, 2007 at 
11:00 AM in Third floor, Rm 303 with Commissioner PATTON. 
12-06-06 FINAL PRETRIAL scheduled on February 22, 2007 at 02:00 PM in 
Third floor, Rm 303 with Commissioner PATTON. 
12-06-06 Minute Entry - Minutes for ORAL ARGUMENT/ MTN TO DISQUA 
Commissioner: THOMAS PATTON 
Clerk: emilyp 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff(s): WHITNEY WILLIAMS 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): ROSEMOND V BLAKELOCK 
Attorney for the Respondent: RONALD R MADSON 
Respondent(s): JOSHUA DANIEL MADSON 
Audio 
Tape Number: 06-27-303 Tape Count: 10:06-11:04 
HEARING 
TAPE: 06-27-303 COUNT: 10:06 
Both parties are present and represented by counsel. Each counsel 
state their version of the status of this case. Ms. Blakelock 
present her argument. Mr. Madsen responds. The Court continues 
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the Motion to Dismqualify. The Court instrusts 
Ms. Blakelock to supplement her pladings and states every 
allegation she is claiming. Mr. Madsen is instructed to file a 
respose. The Court questions Mr. Madsen as his previolusly filed 
February 6 affidavit. The Court sites Rule 1.7(a))2). 
The Court notes that the order from January 6, 2006 hearing does 
not have a mailing certificate attached. The court finds that the 
Respondent is not prejudice if this Court continues the scheduled 
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deposition for tomorrow. This Court specifically 
authorizes Mr. Madsen to do telephone depositions from Hawaii. 
This court expects the parties and the attorney's to conduct 
themselves civilly during depositions. This Court will schedule 
telephone conferences on January 4 and January 10, 2007 
both at 11:00 a.m. Ms. Blakelock will supplement her pleadings by 
December 13, 2006 and Mr. Madsen will respond by December 22, 2006. 
This Court continues the oral argument on the Motion to Disqualify 
on January 3, 2007 @ 2:00 p.m. 
By the end of January 2007 this court expects both counsel to 
contact eachother as to what discovery is still needed. This 
matter is set for a final pretrial on February 22, 2007 @ 2:00 p.m. 
Ms. Blakelock is instructed to complete 
her initial disclos ures by end of December 2006. Mr. Madsen is 
instructed to prepare the appropraite order. 
MTN TO DISQUALIFY ORAL ARG is scheduled. 
Date: 01/03/2007 
Time: 02:00 p.m. 
Location: Third floor, Rm 303 
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT 
125 N 100 W 
PROVO, UT 84 601 
Before Commissioner: THOMAS PATTON 
TELEPHONE CONF/ DEPOSITIONS T. 
Date: 01/04/2007 
Time: 11:00 a.m. 
Location: Third floor, Rm 303 
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT 
125 N 100 W 
PROVO, UT 8 4 601 
Before Commissioner: THOMAS PATTON 
PHONE CONF/ DEPOSITIONS STAT. 
Date: 01/10/2007 
Time: 11:00 a.m. 
Location: Third floor, Rm 303 
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT 
125 N 100 W 
PROVO, UT 84 601 
Before Commissioner: THOMAS PATTON 
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FINAL PRETRIAL. 
Date: 02/22/2007 
Time: 02:00 p.m. 
Location: Third floor, Rm 303 
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT 
125 N 100 W 
PROVO, UT 84 601 
Before Commissioner: THOMAS PATTON 
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Audio 
Tape Number: 07-01-303 
HEARING 
TAPE: 07-01-303 This matter is stricken. 
01-04-07 Note: CD picked up by Rose Blakelock 
01-04-07 Fee Account created Total Due: 4.75 
01-04-07 COPY FEE Payment Received: 4.75 
01-04-07 Fee Account created Total Due: 10.00 
01-04-07 AUDIO TAPE COPY Payment Received: 10.00 
01-09-07 Filed: Petitioner's Initial Disclosures 
01-09-07 Filed order: Order 12/6/06 
Judge STEVEN L. HANSEN 
Signed January 09, 2007 
01-10-07 Filed: Notice of Appearance (J. D. Madson for Respondent) 
01-10-07 Filed: Objection to Commissioner's Ruling of January 3, 2007 
01-23-07 Filed return: Certificate of Mailing of Petitioner's Answers to 
Respondent Third Set of Request for Admissions to Joshua Madson 
Party Served: J. Madson 
Service Type: Mail 
Service Date: January 23, 2007 
01-29-07 Filed: Verified Response to Objection to Commissioner's Ruling 
of January 3, 2007 
02-01-07 Filed: Reply to Response to Objection to Commissioner's Ruling 
of January 3,2007 
02-01-07 Filed: Notice to Submit for Decision in Re: Objection to 
Commissioner Ruling of January 3, 2007 Expedited Request 
02-01-07 Filed return: Certificate Of Mailing 
Party Served: MADSON, JOSHUA DANIEL 
Service Type: Mail 
Service Date: January 31, 2007 
02-02-07 Filed: Notice of Deposition to Whitney Williams 
02-02-07 Filed: Notice of Deposition to Whitney Williams 
02-02-07 Filed order: Recommndation and Order Granting Motion to 
Disqualify Ronald R. Madson as Counsel for Respondent 
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Judge FRED D HOWARD 
Signed February 02, 2007 
02-05-07 Filed: Appearance of Counsel and Reqeust for Extension of 
Discovery Deadlines 
02-07-07 Notice - NOTICE for Case 044400031 ID 9534345 
OBJECTION TO RECOMMENDATION is scheduled. 
Date: 02/21/2007 
Time: 11:00 a.m. 
Location: Second Floor, Rm 202 
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT 
125 N 100 W 
PROVO, UT 84 601 
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12-07-06 Filed: Request For Copy Of Video/ Audio Record (already picked 
up) 
12-07-06 Fee Account created Total Due: 10.00 
12-07-06 AUDIO TAPE COPY Payment Received: 10.00 
Note: rec num 030 
12-11-06 Fee Account created Total Due: 5.00 
12-11-06 MISCELLANEOUS FEE Payment Received: 5.00 
Note: MISCELLANEOUS FEE, rec num 006 
12-13-06 Filed: Affidavit Of Petitioner In Support Of Motion To 
Disqualify Ronald R. Madson As Counsel For Respondent 
12-13-06 Filed: Affidavit Of Marissa Robert 
12-14-06 Filed: Proposed Order Certeificat of Mailing 
12-19-06 Filed: Amended Affidavit of Petitioner in Support of Motion to 
Disqualify Ronald R. Madson as Counsel for Respondent 
12-22-06 Filed: Response to Affidavit of Petitioner in Re: Motion to 
Disqualify Respondent's Counsel & Request for Attorney Fees and 
Costs 
01-03-07 Minute Entry - Minutes for MTN TO DISQUALIFY & ORAL ARG 
Commissioner: THOMAS PATTON 
Clerk: robynk 
PRESENT 
Petitioner's Attorney: ROSEMOND V BLAKELOCK 
Petitioner(s): WHITNEY WILLIAMS 
Attorney for the Respondent: RONALD R MADSON 
Respondent(s): JOSHUA DANIEL MADSON 
Audio 
Tape Number: 07 01 303 Tape Count: 2:14-3:14 
HEARING 
TAPE: 07 01 303 COUNT: 2:14-3:14 
This matter comes before the Court for Oral Argument on a Motion 
To Disqualify. Both parties are present and represented by 
counsel. Ms Blakelock presents her argument and notes that a 
written custody evaluation is complete. Mr Ronald Madson responds. 
The Court takes this matter under advisement at 2:32:17. Court 
resumes at 2:50:02. The Court notes that they have primarily 
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considered the needs of the minor child, in reaching their 
decision. The Court refers to Elmer vs. Elmer, a Utah Supreme 
Court 
Decision from 1989. The Court then refers to the introductory 
paragraph of the parties1 Decree. The law, as stated, presumes that 
a litigant has the right to choose the attorney of their choice, 
and that presumption would apply even to today. 
The Court finds that if there was a sufficient basis to disqualify 
Mr Ronald Madson, prior to trial, the Court would be able to 
disqualify him. The Court is relying on DJ Investment Group vs. 
v»ttTv//Yf4ismaR utrrmrts crov/r,asesearch/CaseSearch?action=caseHist 10/8/2007 
L agC 17.U1 Z,Z, 
Before Judge: FRED D HOWARD 
The Court has set aside 30 minutes to hear oral argument on 
Respondent's Objection to Commissioner's Ruling of January 3, 2007. 
02-07-07 OBJECTION TO RECOMMENDATION scheduled on February 21, 2007 at 
11:00 AM in Second Floor, Rm 202 with Judge HOWARD. 
02-07-07 Filed: Notice Of Entry Of Recommendation And Order Granting 
Motion To Disqualify Ronald R. Madson As Counsel For Respondent 
02-16-07 OBJECTION TO RECOMMENDATION scheduled on April 02, 2007 at 
09:00 AM in Second Floor, Rm 202 with Judge HOWARD. 
02-16-07 Filed: Motion For Continuance And Request For Expedited Ruling 
Filed by: MADSON, JOSHUA DANIEL 
02-22-07 Minute Entry - Minutes for Pretrial Conference 
Commissioner: THOMAS PATTON 
Clerk: emilyp 
PRESENT 
Petitioner's Attorney: ROSEMOND V BLAKELOCK 
Attorney for the Respondent: RONALD D WILKINSON 
Audio 
Tape Number: 07-05-303 Tape Count: 2:51-2:52 
HEARING 
TAPE: 07-05-303 COUNT: 2:51-2 
Both counsel are present and agree to continue this matter to 
April 19, 2007 @ 2:00 p.m. 
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE. 
Date: 04/19/2007 
Time: 02:00 p.m. 
Location: Third floor, Rm 303 
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT 
125 N 100 W 
PROVO, UT 84 601 
Before Commissioner: THOMAS PATTON 
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02-23-07 Filed: Notice of Continuance to 4/2/07 
02-26-07 PRETRIAL CONFERENCE scheduled on April 19, 2007 at 02:00 PM in 
Third floor, Rm 303 with Commissioner PATTON. 
03-01-07 Filed: Notice Of Pre-Trial Scheduling Conference (Scheduled 
4/19/07) 
03-23-07 Filed return: Certificate Of Service Of Respondent's Answer To 
Petitioner's Interrogatories And Request For Production Of 
Documents (Mailed To R Blakelock) 
Party Served: WILLIAMS, WHITNEY 
Service Type: Mail 
Service Date: March 21, 2007 
04-02-07 Minute Entry - Minutes for ORAL ARGUMENT 
Judge: FRED D HOWARD 
httn://xchane:e.utcourts.sov/casesearch/CaseSearch?action=:caseHist 10/8/2007 
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Clerk: miket 
PRESENT 
Petitioner's Attorney: ROSEMOND V BLAKELOCK 
Attorney for the Respondent: RONALD D WILKINSON 
Respondent(s): JOSHUA DANIEL MADSON 
Audio 
Tape Number: 07-5-202 Tape Count: 9:12-9:36 
HEARING 
Counsel address the Court as to Respondents Objection to 
Commissioner's Ruling of January 3, 2007. The Court sustains the 
objection and overturns the Commissioner's ruling to disqualify 
Ronald R. Madson as counsel for Respondent. 
Mr. Wilkinson is to prepare the order. 
04-19-07 Notice - NOTICE for Case 044400031 ID 9591331 
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE. 
Date: 05/10/2007 
Time: 02:00 p.m. 
Location: Third floor, Rm 303 
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT 
125 N 100 W 
PROVO, UT 84 601 
Before Commissioner: THOMAS PATTON 
The reason for the change is Counsel stipulated. 
Failure to appear at Pretrial may result in the Court striking your 
pleadings and entering judgment by default. 
04-19-07 PRETRIAL CONFERENCE rescheduled on May 10, 2007 at 02:00 PM 
Reason: Counsel stipulated.. 
05-01-07 Filed order: Order 
Judge FRED D HOWARD 
Signed May 01, 2007 
05-01-07 Fee Account created Total Due: 10.00 
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05-01-07 AUDIO TAPE COPY Payment Received: 10.00 
Note: rec # 015 
05-04-07 Fee Account created Total Due: 0.75 
05-04-07 COPY FEE Payment Received: 0.75 
Note: 1.00 cash tendered. 0.25 change given. 
05-07-07 Filed: Audio Request for Ron Madson Assigned to Hansen's Team 
05-09-07 Filed: Request For Copy Of Video/ Audio Record - receipted 
05-14-07 Filed: Request for Order to Produce Military Records 
Filed by: MADSON, JOSHUA DANIEL 
05-16-07 Filed: Notice of Entry of Order 
05-21-07 Filed: Notice of Filing of Petition to Appeal From 
Interlocutory Order 
05-29-07 Filed: Copy of Letter from Court of Appeals dated 5-24-07 — 
Petition for Interlocutory Appeal has been filed with Court of 
httr>://xchange.utcouTts.eov/casesearch/CaseSearch?action:=caseHist 10/8/2007 
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Appeals (20070394) 
06-06-07 Filed: Notice to Submit For Decision 
06-21-07 Filed: Letter from Court of Appeals dated 6-20-07 w/attached 
Order — Petition for Permission to Appeal from Interlocutory 
is Granted 
06-28-07 Filed: Notice That No Transcripts Are Required by 
Respondent/Appellant Pursuant to URAP 11 
07-12-07 Filed: Receipt of Requested Audio from Hearing Dated 1/3/07 
07-12-07 Fee Account created Total Due: 10.00 
07-12-07 AUDIO TAPE COPY Payment Received: 10.00 
Note: Record #001 
07-12-07 Note: CD picked up by C. Brown. 
07-19-07 Filed: Clerk1s Certificate 
07-19-07 Filed: Clerk's Certificate of Transcript 
07-19-07 Filed: Judgment Roll and Index 
07-19-07 Note: Record Index sent to Utah Supreme Court via state mail 
tracking #55500042673 
08-08-07 Filed: Motion to Compel 
Filed by: MADSON, JOSHUA DANIEL 
08-30-07 Filed: Notice to Submit for Expedited Decision in Re: Motion to 
Compel & Attorney Fees 
09-04-07 Filed: Motion to Continue Depositions Due to Conflict of 
Schedule 
Filed by: WILLIAMS, WHITNEY 
09-04-07 Filed: Response to Notice to Submit for Expedited Decision 
WHITNEY WILLIAMS 
09-04-01 Filed: Response to Motion to Compel 
WHITNEY WILLIAMS 
09-04-07 Filed: Motion to Stay All Proceedings, Including Discovery, 
Until Interlocutory Appeal Process in Completed at the Utah 
Court of Appeals 
Filed by: WILLIAMS, WHITNEY 
09-06-07 Filed order: Ruling Denying Motion to Compel Discovery 
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Judge FRED D HOWARD 
Signed September 05, 2007 
09-10-07 Filed: Motion to Compel Discovery 
Filed by: MADSON, JOSHDA DANIEL 
09-10-07 Filed: Response To Motion To Continue Depositions 
09-10-07 Filed: Reply To Response To Respondents1 Notice To Submit 
Motion To Compel For Expeditied Decision 
09-10-07 Filed: Reply To Petitioner's Opposition ToRespondent's Motion 
To Compel 
09-14-07 Filed: Opposition to Motion to Stay All Proceedings, Including 
Discovery Until Interlocutory Appeal Process Is Completed at 
the Court of Appeals 
09-17-07 Filed: Notice to Submit And Request For Expedited Ruling Or 
Phone Conference With The Court 
09-20-07 Filed order: Ruling Re: Petitioner's Motion to Stay All 
htln://xchange.utcourts.20v/casesearch/CaseSearch?action=caseHist 10/8/2007 
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Proceedings [denied] 
Judge FRED D HOWARD 
Signed September 20, 2007 
09-20-07 Filed: Response to Notice to Submit and Request for Expedited 
Ruling in Re: Motion to Stay All Proceedings 
09-24-07 Fee Account created Total Due: 1.50 
09-24-07 COPY FEE Payment Received: 1.50 
09-27-07 Filed return: Certificate of Hand Delivery 
Party Served: MADSON, RONALD R 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: September 27, 2007 
10-01-07 Filed: Notice to Submit For Expedited Decision In Re; Motion To 
Compel & Attorney Fees 
10-04-07 Filed order: Ruling Re: Respondent's Motion to Compel Discovery 
[granted] 
Judge FRED D HOWARD 
Signed October 04, 2007 
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ADDENDUM B 
Judge Howard's Order on Respondent's Objection to 
Commissioner Patton 
PILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
5/J /07 4HSI Dftpi<ty 
Ron D. Wilkinson (5558) 
The Heritage Building 
815 East 800 South 
Orem, UT 84097 
Telephone: (801) 225-6040 
Facsimile: (801) 225-6041 
Co-counsel for Respondent 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
T 
WHITNEY WILLIAMS, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
JOSHUA DANIEL MADSON, 
Respondent. 
ORDER 
Case INTo.: 044400031 
Judge Fred D.Howard DlV 3 
Commissioner: Thomas R. Patton 
On the second (2 ) day of April 2007, this matter can te before the Honorable 
Fred D. Howard for hearing on Respondent's Objection to the Commissioner's 
"Recommendation and Order Granting Motion to Disqualify RonaETR. Madsofi ss 
Counsel for Respondent/* After hearing argument and profft r from both parties and after 
carefully reviewing the court file and Utah law, this Court orders as follows: 
1. Excepting the ruling prohibiting Mr. Ronald K. Madson in appearing as 
counsel at trial, the Respondent's Objection to the Commissioner's 
recommendations are sustained and Mr. Ronald R. Madson may, in all 
other capacities, act as counsel for Responded. 
2. In making said ruling, this Court specifically finds as follows: 
A. It was over sixteen (16) months after learning of a potential 
problem or conflict before Petitioner filed her Motion to 
Disqualify. 
B. Thereby, Petitioner failed to "immediately file" and "diligently 
pursue" her request for disqualification of Mr. Ronald R. Madson. 
C. Requiring Mr. Ronald R. Madson to wi thdraw would cause a 
"serious hardship" on Respondent and would, thereby, cause 
serious prejudice to the Respondent. 
3. Wherefore, there are no restrictions placed upon Mr. Ronald R. Madson 
representing Respondent and he is fixlly able to continue his representation 
of the Respondent, excepting advocating at trial 
ADDENDUM C 
Commissioner Patton's Recommendation and Order 
Granting Motion to Disqualify 
Foil rib o/ 
%JL*ty 
ROSEMOND G. BLAKELOCK #6183 
Attorney for Petitioner 
75 South 300 West 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone: (801) 379-0700 
Facsimile: (801) 379-0701 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601 
WHITNEY WILLIAMS, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
JOSHUA DANIEL MADSON, 
Respondent. 
* 
* 
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k 
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k 
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RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER 
GRANTING MOTION TO DISQUALIFY 
RONALD R. MADSON AS COUNSEL 
FOR RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
Commissioner Thomas Patton 
Division 6 
This matter came on for oral arguments on January 3, 2007, 
before the Honorable Thomas Patton. Present was the Petitioner 
and her counsel, Rosemond Blakelock. The Respondent was present 
and represented by counsel, Ronald R. Madson. The Court heard the 
arguments and proffers of both counsel, examined the file and the 
contents therein and deeming itself to be fully informed the in 
the circumstances, recommends and orders as follows: 
2 
RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER DISQUALIFYING RONALD MADSON AS COUNSEL 
FOR RESPONDENT 
1. The Court finds that it primarily considered the needs of 
Luke, when examining the Motion to Disqualify Ronald Madson, as 
counsel for Respondent. 
2. The minor child in this matter is barely four years old. 
The Court cites to Elmer v. Elmer 776 P.2d 599 (Utah Supreme Ct. 
1989). Elmer states, at page 605, that when there is a claim of 
change of circumstances in custody cases that the trial court may 
also examine the issue of the best interests and general welfare 
of a minor child. The Court may also wish to examine the issues 
of stability and continuity of care that exists, in relation to 
the minor child. 
3. The Court finds that, pursuant to Elmer, the trial court 
may wish to take evidence and testimony that predates the date 
upon which the Decree of Divorce was entered in this matter. The 
Court finds that the rights of the minor child outweigh the 
rights of either party. 
4. The Court finds that a litigant has a right to choose who 
their attorney will be. In this matter, the paternal grandfather 
has been the attorney for the Respondent. The Respondent is the 
father of the minor child. 
3 
5. The Court finds that a lawyer can be disqualified at a 
time prior to trial in a matter. Ronald R. Madson may be 
disqualified prior to trial, if there is a sufficient basis to 
disqualify Ronald R. Madson. In reaching this conclusion the 
Court relies on the case of D. J. Investment Group, LLC v. Dae 
Westbrook, LLC 113 P.3d 1022 (Ut. Ct. App. 2005). In examining 
the case, the Court finds that it is clear that a lawyer can be 
disqualified prior to trial. In examining the issue, the court 
finds that Rule 3.7, Lawyer as a Witness, was the applicable 
Rule, in this matter. The Court finds that in the examination of 
Rule 3.7, that the Comments to Rule 3.7, of the Annotated Rules 
of Rules of Professional Conduct states as follows: 
"Combining the roles of advocate and witness can prejudice 
the opposing party and can involve a conflict of interest between 
lawyer and client. The opposing party has a proper objection 
where the combination of roles may prejudice that party's rights 
in the litigation. A witness is required to testify on the basis 
of personal knowledge, while an advocate is expected to explain 
and comment on evidence given by others. It may not be clear 
whether a statement by an advocate-witness should be taken as 
proof or as an analysis of the proof". 
6. The Court finds the examination of the Rule is important 
because the comments attempt to explain why Rule 3.7 is in place. 
4 
7. The court should not be forced to determine if the 
lawyer is arguing an advocate, or is testifying on personal 
knowledge. While the attorney may advocate for his client, he may 
not testify on personal knowledge. When that occurs, then the 
Court is forced to determine if the lawyer is in fact credible. 
8. At the prior hearing in this matter, the Court indicated 
that Ronald R. Madson had filed numerous affidavits with the 
court, regarding the Petitioner and the Respondent. The 
affidavits filed by Ronald Madson in case number 044400031 would 
not be sufficient to disqualify Ronald Madson from going forward 
as the attorney for the Respondent, The Court did not rely on 
those affidavits previously filed in case number 044400031. 
9. In case number 034402607, which is a Protective Order 
action, attorney J. Grant Moody, on behalf of Respondent, filed 
an affidavit from Ronald R. Madson, which was dated January 13, 
2004. Ronald R. Madson signed the affidavit. Although much of the 
affidavit deals with a discussion of finances, the court does not 
find enough information in that affidavit to disqualify Ronald 
Madson. The combination of those affidavits, as mentioned above, 
would not be enough to disqualify Ronald R. Madson. 
10. The Court finds that it is the job of Petitioner to show 
that there is a justifiable reason to exclude Ronald R. Madson as 
counsel for the Respondent. The Court must determine if Ronald R. 
5 
Madson is a witness, if he has made himself a witness, or if 
Ronald R. Madson"s credibility been placed at issue. If that 
occurs then Ronald R. Madson may be disqualified as counsel for 
Respondent. In that regard, Ronald R. Madson has filed a 
document with the court on December 22, 2006 entitled Response to 
Affidavit of Petitioner, in Re: Motion To Disqualify Respondent's 
Counsel and Request for Attorney's Fees and Costs. 
10. The Court finds that the document was well written, for 
the most part, and very helpful. Then, there is a section/heading 
in the document, which was drafted and signed by Ronald R. 
Madson, entitled "Responses to Specific Allegations'7. The Court 
finds that in the document, everything up to that point, if that 
is all that were submitted, would not be enough to disqualify 
Ronald R. Madson. 
11. However, Ronald R. Madson states, in the section 
entitled "Response to Specific Allegations" as follows: "For 
clarity sake and for purposes of this Motion to disqualify I 
affirm that I have had no contact, made no effort to contact, had 
no communication with the Petitioner since January 14, 2004 (a 
full year before the divorce and nearly three years ago), and 
other than being in court and pleading which are before the 
court." 
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12. The Court finds that statement is clearly a statement 
made by Ronald R. Madson, who is the paternal grandfather of the 
minor child and that the statement was made on the record, for 
the court to consider, in determining a ruling on this motion. It 
was signed by Mr. Ronald R. Madson and not supported by an 
affidavit from the Respondent. The father/Respondent in this 
matter did not submit a signed affidavit to the Court on December 
22, 2007 in response to the Motion of the Petitioner. 
13. Ronald R. Madson submitted the document after the court 
had clearly indicated, at the last hearing, the court would be 
looking at averments of counsel in order to determine if Rule 3.7 
was to be applied by the court in this matter. 
14. Then, further on in the same document, under the heading 
A
'Two Post Divorce Allegations", (the court notes the pages are 
not numbered) at the bottom of a page following that heading, 
where there is a number 2, Ronald R. Madson states ^Working 
backwards, there is an allegation of my following the Petitioner 
on December 24, 2005. I did not. I was home that day and frankly, 
I have no idea where the Petitioner was or even if she was in 
town that day. Again, this is pure fabrication. I have no 
interest in having any contact now or in the future with the 
Petitioner and in fact our of pure fear we have to try to avoid 
any contact." 
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15. The Court finds it interesting that Ronald R. Madson 
used the term "we" to detail his allegation that he and the 
Respondent had to avoid contact with the Petitioner. 
16. Then, in the same document, under the heading "Incidents 
Alleged A Year or More Before The Divorce", Ronald R. Madson 
states, on the next page, beginning of first full paragraph: 
"Later Ms. Blakelock stated the kicking in the door incident 
was December 3rd and she had the police report right in front of 
her. Where was that report? Where is that incident in the 
Petitioner's affidavit." 
17. The Court finds that statement to be a statement of an 
attorney who is advocating for his client. However, Ronald R. 
Madson then jumps and changes his status to that of a witness and 
states: "The closest may be when I changed the locks on the 
apartment my son was staying at which apartment I owned and with 
his permission and for obvious reasons. Id did not even come in 
through the door, let alone kick it." 
18. Paragraph 7, written by Ronald R. Madson, goes on to 
state: "I came to the apartment, met with the police and 
Petitioner left. I stayed the whole night with my son and did 
not go to her boyfriend's apartment and I am certain if they 
imagined I did go there, another call to the police would have 
8 
occurred. For background look at the police report for that night 
and note what the police officer said." 
19. On the following page, at paragraph 10, Ronald R. Madson 
states: "I categorically deny ever threatening the Petitioner 
with litigation". 
20. If you go through the pleading as filed by Ronald R. 
Madson, it is clear that Ronald R. Madson jumps back and forth, 
from that of a witness, to that of an advocate for his son, the 
Respondent. That is the very actions and activities that Rule 3.7 
is intended to prevent and stop. 
21. In addition, even at the hearing on January 3, 2007 
before the Court, during the process of oral arguments, Ronald R. 
Madson made a point of stating and informing the court, that he, 
(Ronald R. Madson), had been a member of the Nevada State Bar, 
where he had practiced for 20 years. Ronald R. Madson informed 
the Court that he had never had a complaint filed against him, 
while practicing in Nevada. 
22. Clearly, these statements were an attempt to bolster 
Ronald R. Madson's credibility with the court. 
23. The Court finds specifically that the trial court may be 
very interested in finding out whether or not Petitioner is 
telling the truth. 
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24. The Court finds it will be critical to this case to 
determine Petitioner's credibility. 
25. The Court finds that Ronald R. Madson's testimony, in 
regard to Petitioner's credibility, may be critical. 
26. The Court cannot determine at this time which party is 
telling the truth - Ronald R. Madson, or the Petitioner. 
27. The Court finds that it may be critical to the minor 
child for the trial court to make such a determination. The Court 
finds that the documents supplied by Ronald R. Madson, in the 
Response to Affidavit of Petitioner in Re: Motion to Disqualify 
Respondent's Counsel and Request for Attorney's Fees and Costs, 
filed on December 22, 2006, clearly violates the purpose of the 
Rule 3.7 and also forces the Court to try to determine if Ronald 
R. Madson is an advocate, or a witness. 
28. For all the foregoing reasons, Ronald R. Madson is 
hereby disqualified from appearing in court on behalf of the 
Respondent. Ronald R. Madson is hereby disqualified from taking 
depositions in this case. Ronald R. Madson is hereby 
disqualified from appearing at trial as anything but a witness. 
29. Ronald R. Madson shall be permitted to assist the 
Respondent in completing research and he may be permitted to 
10 
assist the Respondent, or his counsel, in the preparation of 
documents. 
3^ 
Dated and signed this %^ day of January 2007 
Commissioner Thomas Patton 
Dis t r i c t -Court Judge ^ 
B^j^torney for Pe t i t ione r 
STAMP USED ATDJ^c i i oF lSo i 
ADDENDUM D 
Relevant Statutes and Rules 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(h) 
Utah Rules Professional Conduct 3.7 
557 JUDICIAL CODE 78-3-2 
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as foi 
the Supreme Court IWB 
78-2a 3 C o u r t of Appeals j u r i s d i c t i o n 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all ex 
traordmary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders and de 
crees, or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, mclud 
mg jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from 
the district court review of informal adjudicative proceed 
mgs of the agencies, except the Public Service Commis-
sion, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional 
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire 
and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive direc 
tor of the Department of Natural Resources, Boaid of Oil, 
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer, 
(b) appeals from the district court review of 
d) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political 
subdivisions of the s tate or other local agencies, and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 
63 46a 12 1, 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts, 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record m 
criminal cases, except those involving a charge of a first 
degree oi capital felony, 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a conviction or charge of a first 
degree felony or capital felony, 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary 
writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving 
any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting 
a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first 
degree or capital felony, 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordi-
nary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of 
Pardons and Parole except m cases involving a first 
degree or capital felony, 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic rela-
tions cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, annul-
ment, property division, child custody, support, parent-
tuxie, visitation, adoption, and paternity, 
d) appeals from the Utah Military Court, and 
(j) cases tranBfened to the Court of Appeals from the 
. Supreme Court 
|(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by 
fee vote of four judges of the court may ceitify to the Supreme 
fpu-t for original appellate review and determination any 
Sitter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate 
jpsdietion 
$[W) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the require-
ments of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Proceduies 
) in. its review of agency adjudicative proceedings aooi 
f^a-4. Review of actions by Supreme Court 
«vie"w of the judgments, ordeis, and decrees of the Court of 
flpGals shall be by petition for writ of certiorari to the 
Tgtoeme Court lose 
!^ a-5. Location of Court of Appeals, 
«e Court of Appeals has its piin&pal location m Salt Lake 
f 1*he Couit of Appeals may perform any of its functions m 
| "Nation within the 9tate i9Bfl 
#a-6 Appel la te M e d i a t i o n Office — P r o t e c t e d 
records and information — Governmental lm-
ft mumty. 
ft' Unless a more restrictive rule of court is adopted pur-
^ to Subsection 63 2-201(3)(b), infoimation and records 
relating to an ' matter on appeal received or generated by the 
Chief Appelh te Mediatoi or other staff of the Appellate 
Mediation Office as a result of any party's participation or lack 
of parhcipati »n m the settlement program shall be mam 
tamed as pre tected records pursuant to Subsections 63 2 
304(16), (17), '18), and (33) 
(2) In add tion to the access restrictions on protected 
records proviled m Section 63-2-202, the information and 
records may 3 tot be disclosed to judges, staff or employees of 
any court of t his s ta te 
(3) The Chief Appellate Mediator may disclose statistical 
and othei demographic information as may be necessary and 
useful to rep >rt on the s ta tus and to allow supervision and 
oversight of I be Appellate Mediation Office 
(4) When acting as mediators, the Chief Appellate Mediator 
and other professional staff of the Appellate Mediation Office 
shall be immane from liability pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 
30, Utah Go's ernmental Immunity Act 
(5) Pursuant to Utah Constitution, Article VIII, Section 4, 
the Supreme Court may exercise overall supervision of the 
Appellate Mi diation Office as part of the appellate piocess 
2002 
C H A P T E R 3 
D I S T R I C T COURTS 
Section 
78-3 1 to 78 3-2 Repealed 
78-3-3 Term of judges — Vacancy 
78-34 Jurisdiction — Appeals 
78-3-5 Repealed 
78 3-6 Terms — Minimum of once quarterly 
78-3-7 to 78 3-11 Repealed 
78-3-115 State District Court Administrative System 
78-3-12 Repealed 
78-3-12 5 Costs of system 
78-3-13 Repealed 
78-3 13 4 Transfer of court operating responsibilities — 
Facilities — Staff— Budget 
78 3 13 6, 78-3-14 Repealed 
78-3 14 2 District court case management 
78-3 14 6 Allocation of district court fees and forfeitures 
78-3-15 to ' 8 3-17 Repealed 
78-3-17 5 Application of savings accruing to counties 
78-3-18 Judicial Administration Act — Short title 
78-3 19 Purpose of act 
78 3 20 Definitions 
78-3 21 Judicial Council — Creation — Members — 
Teims and election — Responsibilities — 
Reports 
78 3 21 5 Data bases for judicial boards 
78-3-22 Presiding officer — Compensation — Duties 
78 3 23 Admimsti ator of the courts — Appointment — 
Qualifications — Salary 
78-3-24 Court administrator — Powers, duties, and 
responsibilities 
78-3-25 Assistants for administrator of the courts — 
Appomtment of trial court executives 
78 3-26 Courts to provide information and statistical 
data to administrator of the courts 
78 3 27 Annual judicial conference 
78-3 28 Repealed 
78-3-29 Presiding judge—Associate pi esidmg judge — 
Election — le rm — Compensation — Powers 
— Duties 
78 3 30 Duties of the clerk of the district court 
78-3-31 Com t commissioners — Qualifications — Ap 
pointment — Functions governed by rule 
78-3-1 to 78-3-2. R e p e a l e d 1971, 19B1,1988 
Rule 3.7 http://www.utcourts.gov/resources/rules/ucja/13_proco/3_7.htm 
Rule 3.7. Lawyer as Witness. 
(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness unless: 
(a)(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue; 
(a)(2) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case; or 
(a)(3) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the client. 
(b) A lawyer may act as advocate in a trial in which another lawyer in the lawyer's firm is likely to be called as a 
witness unless precluded from doing so by Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9. 
Comment 
[1] Combining the roles of advocate and witness can prejudice the tribunal and the opposing party and can also 
involve a conflict of interest between the lawyer and client. 
Advocate-Witness Rule 
[2] The tribunal has proper objection when the trier of fact may be confused or misled by a lawyer serving as both 
advocate and witness. The opposing party has proper objection where the combination of roles may prejudice that 
party's rights in the litigation. A witness is required to testify on the basis of personal knowledge, while an 
advocate is expected to explain and comment on evidence given by others. It may not be clear whether a 
statement by an advocate-witness should be taken as proof or as an analysis of the proof. 
[3] To protect the tribunal, paragraph (a) prohibits a lawyer from simultaneously serving as advocate and 
necessary witness except in those circumstances specified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (a)(3). Paragraph (a)(1) 
recognizes that if the testimony will be uncontested, the ambiguities in the dual role are purely theoretical. 
Paragraph (a)(2) recognizes that where the testimony concerns the extent and value of legal services rendered in 
the action in which the testimony is offered, permitting the lawyers to testify avoids the need for a second trial 
with new counsel to resolve that issue. Moreover, in such a situation the judge has firsthand knowledge of the 
matter in issue; hence, there is less dependence on the adversary process to test the credibility of the testimony. 
[4] Apart from these two exceptions, paragraph (a)(3) recognizes that a balancing is required between the 
interests of the client and those of the tribunal and the opposing party. Whether the tribunal is likely to be misled 
or the opposing party is likely to suffer prejudice depends on the nature of the case, the importance and probable 
tenor of the lawyer's testimony, and the probability that the lawyer's testimony will conflict with that of other 
witnesses. Even if there is risk of such prejudice, in determining whether the lawyer should be disqualified, due 
regard must be given to the effect of disqualification on the lawyer's client. It is relevant that one or both parties 
could reasonably foresee that the lawyer would probably be a witness. The conflict of interest principles stated in 
Rules 1.7, 1.9 and 1.10 have no application to this aspect of the problem. 
[5] Because the tribunal is not likely to be misled when a lawyer acts as advocate in a trial in which another lawyer 
in the lawyer's firm will testify as a necessary witness, paragraph (b) permits the lawyer to do so except in 
situations involving a conflict of interest 
Conflict of Interest 
[6] In determining if it is permissible to act as advocate in a trial in which the lawyer will be a necessary witness, 
the lawyer must also consider that the dual role may give rise to a conflict of interest that will require compliance 
with Rules 1.7 or 1.9. For example, if there is likely to be substantial conflict between the testimony of the client 
and that of the lawyer, the representation involves a conflict of interest that requires compliance with Rule 1.7. 
This would be true even though the lawyer might not be prohibited by paragraph (a) from simultaneously serving as 
advocate and witness because the lawyer- s disqualification would work a substantial hardship on the client. 
Similarly, a lawyer who might be permitted to simultaneously serve as an advocate and a witness by paragraph 
(a)(3) might be precluded from doing so by Rule 1.9. The problem can arise whether the lawyer is called as a 
witness on behalf of the client or is called by the opposing party. Determining whether or not such a conflict exists 
is primarily the responsibility of the lawyer involved. If there is a conflict of interest, the lawyer must secure the 
client= s informed consent, confirmed in writing. In some cases, the lawyer will be precluded from seeking the 
client= s consent. See Rule 1.7. See Rule 1.0(b) for the definition of "confirmed in writing" and Rule 1.0(e) for the 
definition of "informed consent." 
[7] Paragraph (b) provides that a lawyer is not disqualified from serving as an advocate because a lawyer with 
whom the lawyer is associated in a firm is precluded from doing so by paragraph (a). If, however, the testifying 
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lawyer would also be disqualified by Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9 from representing the client in the matter, other lawyers in 
the firm will be precluded from representing the client by Rule 1.10 unless the client gives informed consent under 
the conditions stated in Rule 1.7. 
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Case Law 
D.J. Investment Group, LLC v. Dae/Westbrook LLC, 113 P.3d 
525 (Utah App. 2005) 
D.J. Investment Group, LLC v. Dae/Westbrook LLC, 147 P.3d 
414 (Utah 2006) 
Zions First National Bank v. Barbara Jensen Interior, Inc., 
781 P.2d 478 (Utah App. 1989) 
Wfestlaw. 
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(Cite as: 113 P3d 1022) 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
D.J. INVESTMENT GROUP, L.L.C., a Utah limited 
liability company, Plaintiff and 
Appellee, 
v. 
DAE/WESTBROOK, L.L.C., a Delaware limited li-
ability company; Draper City, a 
municipal corporation; and John Does 1 to 15, De-
fendant and Appellant. 
No. 20040340-CA. 
May 5,2005. 
Background: One limited liability company (L.L.C.) 
entered settlement negotiations with another L.L.C. 
which resulted in dismissal of prior suit. Plaintiff 
L.L.C. brought suit three years after defendant L.L.C. 
rescinded the agreement. Plaintiff sought to disquali-
fy defendant's attorney, who participated in the ori-
ginal settlement agreement, on grounds he was a ne-
cessary witness. The Fourth District Court, Provo De-
partment, Lynn W. Davis. J., denied the motion, and 
plaintiff filed interlocutory appeal. 
Holding: The Court of Appeals, Billings. P.J., held 
that plaintiff was not entitled to disqualification of 
defendant's attorney. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Appeal and Error €>=^949 
30k949 Most Cited Cases 
The standard of review generally for decisions relat-
ing to attorney disqualification is abuse of discretion, 
unless the court is called upon to resolve solely a leg-
al or ethical issue. 
[21 Appeal and Error €^>949 
30k949 Most Cited Cases 
Where the trial court's ruling denying disqualification 
of an attorney incorporates both questions of fact and 
law, reviewing court applies an abuse of discretion 
standard. 
[21 Attorney and Client €=>22 
Page 1 
45k22 Most Cited Cases 
In determining whether an attorney should be dis-
qualified on the grounds that he was a likely neces-
sary witness, the trial court is required to balance the 
client's interests with those of the opposing party; 
however, even if there is risk of prejudice to the op-
posing party, due regard must be given to the effect 
of disqualification on the lawyer's client. Rules of 
Prof .Conduct. Rule 3.7. 
[41 Attorney and Client €^>22 
45k22 Most Cited Cases 
Plaintiff was not entitled to disqualification of de-
fendant's attorney, on grounds that the attorney, who 
negotiated on behalf of defendant in reaching settle-
ment, which was later rescinded by defendant and 
resulted in underlying lawsuit, was likely a necessary 
witness in the lawsuit; plaintiff failed to timely file its 
motion and it knew that attorney participated in nego-
tiations at time of filing suit, lawsuit was filed three 
years prior to filing motion, since filing the parties 
had vigorously litigated a number of issued and had 
engaged in a substantial amount of work, and defend-
ant would face substantial hardship if forced to retain 
new counsel. Rules of Prof .Conduct. Rule 3.7. 
[51 Attorney and Client €^>21.20 
45k21.20 Most Cited Cases 
A motion to disqualify counsel is untimely when it is 
not immediately filed and diligently pursued as soon 
as the party becomes aware of the basis for disquali-
fication. 
*1022 Richard W. Casey. Steven G. Crockett, and 
Evelyn J. Furse. Bendinger, Crockett, Peterson, 
Greenwo, Salt Lake City, for Appellant. 
Denver C. Snuffer Jr.. Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & 
Poulsen, Sandy, for Appellee. 
Before BILLINGS. P.J., BENCH. Associate P.J., and 
ORME.J. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
BILLINGS. Presiding Judge: 
5 1 Appellant DAE/Westbrook, L.L.C. (Westbrook) 
fFNll argues that the trial court erred by denying its 
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Motion to Disqualify Denver C. Snuffer Jr. and the 
law firm Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. 
(collectively Snuffer). We affirm. 
FN1. Since filing its Motion to Disqualify, 
Westbrook has changed its name to Sun-
Crest, L.L.C. 
*1023 5 2 On November 16,2000, the parties entered 
into a settlement agreement, which dismissed D J. In-
vestment Group, L.L.C.'s (DJ.) lawsuit against West-
brook. Snuffer, attorney for D.J., was involved in the 
negotiations leading to the settlement agreement. On 
May 7,2001, DJ. rescinded the settlement agreement 
and filed suit against Westbrook. Nearly three years 
later, Westbrook filed a Motion to Disqualify 
Snuffer, relying primarily on Utah Rule of Profes-
sional Conduct 3.7. The trial court denied the Motion 
to Disqualify, and Westbrook subsequently filed this 
interlocutory appeal. 
Ilj |2| 5 3 The standard of review generally for de-
cisions relating to disqualification is abuse of discre-
tion, unless the court is called upon to resolve solely 
a legal or ethical issue. See Houghton v. Department 
of Health. 962 P.2d 58. 61 (Utah 1998) (holding that 
because no issues of fact were presented to the trial 
court, "to the extent this [cjourt has a special interest 
in administering the law governing attorney ethical 
rules, a trial court's discretion is limited"). In contrast, 
"[w]here courts are called upon to resolve numerous 
factual disputes, and the quantity of less tangible 
factors implicating the trial court's decision is large, a 
trial court is naturally in a better position to consider 
and weigh all those circumstances in their application 
to the legal standard at issue." Id. (citing State v. 
Pena. 869 P.2d 932. 935-36 (Utah 1994)). The trial 
court's ruling incorporates both questions of fact and 
law, and thus we apply an abuse of discretion stand-
ard. See Mareulies v. Upchurch. 696 P.2d 1195. 1200 
(Utah 1985) (where the trial court's findings involve 
"mixed questions of fact and law .... the proper stand-
ard of review ... is the abuse of discretion standard"). 
13] 5 4 Westbrook argues that the trial court erred by 
finding that Snuffer's disqualification would work 
substantial hardship on DJ. and by not balancing the 
interests of the parties. rFN2] According to rule 3.7. 
"[a] lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in 
which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness 
except where ... [disqualification of the lawyer 
would work substantial hardship on the client." Utah 
R. Profl Conduct 3.7(a) (emphasis added). In determ-
ining whether an attorney should be disqualified on 
the grounds contemplated by rule 3.7. the trial court 
is required to balance the client's interests with those 
of the opposing party. See Utah R. Profl Conduct 3.7 
cmt. However, even if there is risk of prejudice to the 
opposing party, "due regard must be given to the ef-
fect of disqualification on the lawyer's client" Id. 
(emphasis added). FFN31 
FN2. Westbrook also argues that the trial 
court erred by failing to determine whether 
Snuffer was a necessary witness. However, 
it was not essential that the trial court de-
termine whether Snuffer was a "necessary 
witness" under rule 3.7 of the Utah Rules of 
Professional Conduct because, even if it had, 
the hardship exception would have com-
pelled the same result: Snuffer's disqualific-
ation would force undue hardship upon D J. 
FN3. When issues of professional discretion 
arise, the Utah Rules of Professional Con-
duct call for self-governance. In particular, 
the rules state, 
Violation of a[r]ule should not give rise to a 
cause of action, nor should it create any pre-
sumption that a legal duty has been 
breached. The [r]ules are designed to 
provide guidance to lawyers and to provide 
a structure for regulating conduct through 
disciplinary agencies. They are not designed 
to be a basis for civil liability. Furthermore, 
the purpose of the [r]ules can be subverted 
when they are invoked by opposing parties 
as procedural weapons. 
Utah R. Profl Conduct Scope. 
J41 5 5 Here, the trial court weighed the interests of 
the parties and found that DJ. would face substantial 
hardship in both time and money if forced to hire 
new counsel at such a late stage of discovery. Spe-
cifically, the court noted that 
[tlhe case at bar was filed in May of 2001, almost 
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three years ago, and since that time the parties have 
vigorously litigated an extraordinary number of 
legal issues. The [c]ourt also notes that the parties 
have conducted a significant amount of discovery 
in connection with this litigation. Most, if not all, 
of the key witnesses have been deposed and written 
discovery has been sent out and answered by both 
parties. All things considered, the parties have en-
gaged in a substantial amount of work. Indeed, the 
[c]ourt file now fills seven exceptionally thick 
folders and addresses some very complex legal is-
sues. *1024 The [c]lerk of the [c]ourt has just 
opened the eighth file. Under these circumstances, 
the [c]ourt doubts another attorney could be 
brought up to speed in this matter and recognizes 
that such an effort would require D J. to expend an 
exorbitant amount of time and money. 
i l l 5 6 The trial court also found that Westbrook filed 
its motion in an untimely manner. We agree. A mo-
tion to disqualify counsel is untimely when it is not 
"immediately filed and diligently pursued as soon as 
the party becomes aware of the basis for disqualifica-
tion." Zions First Nafl Bank v. Barbara Jensen In-
teriors. Inc.. 781 P.2d 478. 480-81 (Utah 
Ct.App.1989) (emphasis added) (holding that the de-
fendants' motion to disqualify counsel was untimely 
because it was filed three months after it learned of 
the representation, and one day before the opponent's 
motion to compel settlement was scheduled for hear-
ing). Here the parties were aware that Snuffer would 
likely be a necessary witness at least three months 
prior to filing their motion, if not earlier. |FN4| Thus, 
had Westbrook timely filed its motion, it could have 
significantly reduced DJ.'s costs of retaining and 
bringing new counsel up to speed. 
FN4. At the time the underlying lawsuit was 
filed, both parties were aware of Snuffer's 
participation in the settlement agreement. 
Likewise, the parties were aware of 
Snuffer's participation from the arguments 
presented for and against DJ.'s Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Moreover, even if 
Westbrook did not believe that Snuffer was 
a necessary witness until the trial court in-
dicated parole evidence would be taken in 
regard to the settlement agreement, West-
brook failed to file its Motion to Disqualify 
until three months later. 
5 7 Because DJ. would face substantial hardship if 
forced to retain new counsel at this late stage and 
Westbrook's motion to disqualify Snuffer was un-
timely, we hold that the trial court properly denied 
Westbrook's motion. Accordingly, we affirm. 
5 8 WE CONCUR: RUSSELL W. BENCH. Asso-
ciate Presiding Judge, and GREGORY K. ORME. 
Judge. 
113 P.3d 1022, 525 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 2007 UT App 
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D.J. Investment Group, L.L.C. v. DAE/Westbrook, 
L.L.C. 
Utah,2006. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
DJ. INVESTMENT GROUP, L.L.C, a Utah 
limited liability company, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
DAE/WESTBROOK, L.L.C, a Delaware limited 
liability company; Draper City, a municipal 
corporation; John. Does 1 through 15, Defendants 
and Petitioners. 
NQ. 20050495. 
Oct. 20, 2006. 
Background: In action brought by plaintiff limited 
liability company (LLC) against defendant LLC for 
trespass, the parties negotiate_d a settlement, and 
plaintiff dismissed the suit. Later, plaintiff brought 
action seeking to rescind the settlement agreement 
and to assert multiple claims against defendant. 
Defendant brought motion to disqualify plaintiffs 
counsel under advocate-witness rule. The Fourth 
District Court, Provo Department, Lynn W. Davis, 
J., denied the motion, and plaintiff filed 
interlocutory appeal. The Court of Appeals, 113 
P.3d 1022, affirmed. Certiorari was granted. 
Holdings: The Supreme Court, Durrani, J,5 held 
that: 
(1) trial court was not required to expressly consider 
interests of tribunal, because those interests 
substantially overlapped with parties' interests; 
(2) trial court's determination was entitled to broad 
deference; and 
(3) trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
detennining that disqualification of counsel would 
cause substantial hardship, as exception to 
advocate-witness rule, 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Certiorari 73 €=^64(1) 
73 Certiorari 
73II Proceedings and Determination 
73k63 Review 
73k64 Scope and Extent in General 
73k64(l) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
On certiorari, the Supreme Court reviews for 
correctness the decision of the Court of Appeals, 
not the decision of the District Court. 
[2] Attorney and Client 45 €=>22 
45 Attorney and Client 
451 The Office of Attorney 
451(B) Privileges, Disabilities, and Liabilities 
45k22 k. Acting in Different Capacities; 
Counsel as Witness. Most Cited Cases 
The substantial hardship exception to the general 
rule that a lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial 
in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary 
witness requires a balancing of the hardship that a 
lawyer's disqualification would cause to the lawyer's 
client against the prejudice that the opposing party 
would suffer if the lawyer were to act gs an, 
advocate-witness at trial, and such balancing also 
calls for consideration of the interests of the 
tribunal. Rules of Prof.Conduct, Rule 3.7(a)(3) & 
comment (2004). 
[3] Courts 106 €=>85(2) 
106 Courts 
106II Establishment, Organization, and 
Procedure 
10611(F) Rules of Court and Conduct of 
Business 
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106k85 Operation and Effect of Rules 
106k85(2) k. Construction and 
Application of Rules in General. Most Cited Cases 
While advisory committee comments to rules 
adopted by the Supreme Court are not authoritative, 
the Supreme Court gives them great weight. 
[4] Courts 106 €=^85(2) 
106 Courts 
106II Establishment, Organization, and 
Procedure 
10611(F) Rules of Court and Conduct of 
Business 
106k85 Operation and Effect of Rules 
106k85(2) k. Construction and 
Application of Rules in General. Most Cited Cases 
The Supreme Cpurt generally considers advisory 
committee comments to rules adopted by the 
Supi;em,e Court as, a fairly reliable indicator of the 
Supreme Court's intent in adopting the rules 
because the comments to the rules were available to 
the Supreme Court at the time of their adoption. 
[5] Attorney and Client 45 €^>22 
45 Attorney and Client 
451 The Office of Attorney 
451(B) Privileges, Disabilities, and Liabilities 
45k22 k. Acting in Different Capacities; 
Counsel as Witness. Most Cited Cases 
Interests of tribunal, regarding disqualification, of 
counsel for plaintiff limited liability company 
(LLC) under advocate-witness ri^le, substantially 
overlapped with interests of parties, and, thus, trial 
court was JXQI required to expressly consider 
interests of tribunal when applying balancing test 
for substantial hardship exception to 
advocate-witness rule, in action in which plaintiff 
LLC sought to rescind settlement agreement with 
defendant LLC in plaintiffs trespass action and 
defendant sought to disqualify plaintiffs counsel as 
necessary witness regarding meaning of ambiguous 
provision of settlement agreement; tribunal's 
interests overlapped with defendant's interest in 
avoiding jury confusion and plaintiffs interest in 
avoiding difficulties associated with bringing new 
counsel up to speed late in a case. Rules of 
Prof.Conduct, Rule 3.7(a)(3) & comment (2004). 
[6] Appeal and Error 30 € ^ 9 4 9 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVT(fi) Discretion of Lower Court 
30k949 k. Allowance of Remedy and 
Matters of Procedure jn General Most Cited Cases 
The mixed question of fact and law, regarding 
whether the district court appropriately applied, to 
the facts before it, the substantial hardship 
exception to the advocate-witness rule, is reviewed 
under a deferential abuse of discretion standard, 
with the appellate court giving broad deference to 
the trial court's determination. Rules of 
Prof.Conduct, Rule 3.7(a)(3) & comment. 
[7] Appeal and Error 30 €=^>842(9) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in 
General 
30k838 Questions Considered 
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether 
Questions Are of Law or of Fact 
30k842(9) k. Mixed Questions of 
Law and Fact. Most Cited Cases 
Appellate court selects standard of review, for 
mixed question of fact and law, from a spectrum of 
deference, by weighing the following factors: (1) 
degree of variety and complexity in facts to which 
legal rule is to be applied; (2) degree to which trial 
court's application of legal rule relies on "facts" 
observed by trial judge such as witness's appearance 
and demeanor, which are relevant to application of 
the law but which cannot be adequately reflected in 
record available to appellate courts; and (3) other 
policy reasons that weigh for or against granting 
discretion to trial courts. 
[8] Trial 388 €=^395(5) 
388 Trial 
388X Trial by Court 
388X(B) Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law 
388k395 Sufficiency in General 
3§8k395(5) fc Ultimate or Evidentiary 
Facts. Most Cited Cases 
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Where written findings of fact are required, a trial 
court need not resolve every conflicting evidentiary 
issue; rather, the trial court's factual findings must 
be articulated with sufficient detail so that the basis 
of the ultimate conclusion can be understood. 
[9] Attorney and Client 45 €=>22 
45 Attorney and Client 
451 The Office of Attorney 
451(B) Privileges, Disabilities, and Liabilities 
45k22 k. Acting in Different Capacities; 
Counsel as Witness. Most Cited Cases 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
determining that disqualification of counsel for 
plaintiff limited liability pompany (LLC) would 
cause substantial hardship, as exception to 
advocate-witness rule, in new action in which 
plaintiff LLC sought to rescind settlement 
agreement with defendant LLC in plaintiffs trespass 
action and defendant sought to disqualify plaintiffs 
counsel as necessary witness regarding me.aning of 
ambiguous provision of settlement agreement; case 
involved complex legal issues, parties had 
conducted significant amount of discovery in two 
and one-half years since new action had been filed, 
bringing new counsel- up to speed would be 
expensive to plaintiff and would cause delay, and 
defendant could have reasonably foreseen that 
plaintiffs counsel would be necessary witness yet 
defendant's disqualification motion was untimely. 
Rules of Prof.Conduct, Rule 3.7(a)(3) & comment 
(2004). 
[10] Attorney and Client 45 €^21.20 
45 Attorney and Client 
451 The Office of Attorney 
451(B) Privileges, Disabilities, and Liabilities 
45k21.20 k. Disqualification Proceedings; 
Standing. Most Cited Cases 
A delay in filing a motion to disqualify counsel or 
in notifying opposing counsel that a motion to 
disqualify is likely raises concerns that the party 
who delays may be using the motion as a 
manipulative litigation tactic. Rules of 
Prof.Conduct, Preamble (Scope). 
[11] Attorney and Client 45 €=>22 
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45 Attorney and Client 
451 The Office of Attorney 
451(B) Privileges, Disabilities, and Liabilities 
45k22 k. Acting in Different Capacities; 
Counsel as Witness. Most Cited Cases 
The timeliness of the motion tq disqualify counsel is 
relevant to the balancing test for the substantial 
hardship exception to the advocate-witness rule. 
Rules of Prof.Conduct, Rule 3.7(a)(3) & comment. 
[12] Attorney and Client 45 €=>22 
45 Attorney and Client 
451 The Office of Attorney 
451(B) Privileges, Disabilities, and Liabilities 
45k22 k. Acting in Different Capacities; 
Counsel as Witness. Most Cited Cases 
Substantial hardship exception tQ advocate-witness 
rule does not require potential hardship to client to 
be unique or of a nonmonetary nature. Rules of 
Prof.Conduct, Rule 3.7(a)(3) & comment. 
*416 Denver C. Snuffer, Jr., Sandy, for plaintiff. 
Richard W. Casey, John H. Bogart, Evelyn J. Furse, 
Nicole A,. Skolout, Salt Lake City, for defendants. 
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
DURRANT, Justice: 
1f lRule 3.7(a) of the Utah Rules of Professional 
Conduct generally prohibits a lawyer from "actpng] 
as [an] advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is 
likely to be a necessary witness," but provides an 
exception where disqualification of the lawyer 
would *cwork substantial hardship on the client." FN1 
In this interlocutory appeal, we granted 
certiorari on a single question incorporating two 
issues: (1) whether the substantial hardship 
exception requires courts to balance the interests of 
the client with the interests of the opposing party 
and the tribunal, and (2) whether the substantial 
hardship exception was properly applied in this case. 
FNL Utah R. Prof 1 Conduct 3.7(a). 
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| 2 Defendant DAE/Westbrook, L.L.C., now 
known as SunCrest, L.L.C. ("SunCrest") moved 
under rule 3.7(a) to disqualify lawyer Denver C. 
Snuffer from representing plaintiff DJ. Investment 
Group, L.L.C. ("DJ.") at trial, alleging that 
Snuffer's actions have made him a necessary witness 
in this case. The district court found that the 
disqualification of Snuffer would cause substantial 
hardship to DJ . and denied the motion. SunCrest 
filed an interlocutory appeal, and the court of 
appeals affirmed. SunCrest argues that the court of 
appeals applied the wrong legal test for substantial 
hardship and that it erred in affirming because the 
district court did not conduct an appropriate 
balancing of interests in determining that Snuffer's 
disqualification would cause substantial hardship to 
DJ. We conclude that the substantial hardship 
exception requires a balancing of interests 
consistent with the advisory committee's comment 
to rule 3.7, that an appropriate balancing was 
conducted,, and that the court of appeals correctly 
held that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion when it found that the substantial 
hardship exception applied to the facts of this case. 
We therefore affirm. 
K 3 Although the present lawsuit between 
neighboring landowners DJ. and SunCrest has a 
complex factual history, we discuss only those facts 
necessary to consider SunCrest's appeal from the 
denial of its motion to disqualify opposing counsel 
Denver Snuffer. SunCrest seeks to disqualify 
Snuffer and his firm, Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & 
Poulsen, P.C, from representing DJ. as an 
advocate at trial based on Snuffer's involvement in a 
November 16, 2000 settlement agreement ("the 
Agreement") between SunCrest and D J. that is now 
a subject of dispute in the present case. 
f 4 The Agreement was intended to resolve an 
October 2000 lawsuit brought by DJ. against 
SunCrest for ati alleged trespass. In provision 14 
of the Agreement, SunCrest promised to allow D J. 
to use a "Southerly Roadway" that would be built 
across property belonging to third party Micron 
Technology, Inc. ("Micron"). In return, DJ. agreed 
Page 4 
to dismiss its prior lawsuit and to allow SunCrest to 
use an access road that SunCrest had built over 
DJ.'s property. Snuffer acted as DJ.'s lawyer at all 
times during these events and has continued to 
represent DJ. through the present proceedings. 
The extent of his involvement in negotiating the 
November 2000 Agreement is disputed. 
K 5 A short time after the parties signed the 
Agreement, the dispute between the parties was 
rekindled. According to the district court, " 
[djespite [SunCrest's] representations that it had 
secured the necessary easements to construct the 
Southerly Roadway, the rights to these easements 
may not have been obtained and [SunCrest] is now 
preparing to build the Southerly Highway along a 
different route that does not provide DJ, with [its 
desired] access to State Road 92." On May 7, 
2001, DJ. filed the present lawsuit. It seeks to 
rescind the Agreement and brings multiple claims 
against SunCrest 
1f 6 On February 19, 2004, over two and one-half 
years after DJ. filed its complaint, SunCrest moved 
pursuant to rule 3.7 of the Utah Rules of 
Professional Conduct to disqualify Snuffer from 
representing DJ. at trial, arguing that Snuffer is a 
necessary witness in the case. SunCrest alleges 
that Snuffer played an important role in drafting 
provision 14 of the Agreement regarding the 
Southerly Highway and that his testimony regarding 
the intent of the parties will be crucial. In turn, 
DJ . argues that Snuffer was not present when 
provision 14 was drafted and disputes Snuffer's 
value as a witness. The district court determined 
that Snuffer was involved in many of the 
negotiation sessions regarding the November 2000 
Settlement Agreement and that he advised David 
Mast, the manager and primary member of D J., on 
matters related to the negotiations, but the court did 
not resolve the dispute of fact regarding Snuffer's 
involvement in negotiating and drafting provision 
14. 
1 7 Upon hearing oral arguments on SunCrest's 
motion to disqualify Snuffer, the district court 
issued a written ruling declining to disqualify 
Snuffer and his firm from representing DJ. at trial. 
It reasoned that it need not determine whether 
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Snuffer was likely to be a necessary witness because 
his disqualification would cause substantial 
hardship to D.J. and thus fell within the exception 
provided by rule 3.7(a)(3). After noting that it had 
weighed the interests of the two parties in 
accordance with the comments to rule 3.7, the 
district court stated, 
[T]he parties have conducted a significant amount 
of discovery in connection with this litigation. 
Most, if not all, of the key witnesses have been 
deposed and written discovery has been sent out 
and answered by both parties. All things 
considered, the parties have engaged in a substantial 
amount of work. Indeed, the Court file now fills 
seven exceptionally thick folders and addresses 
some very complex legal issues. The Clerk of the 
Court has just opened the eighth file. Under these 
circumstances, the Court doubts that another 
attorney could be brought up to speed in this matter 
and recognizes that such an effort would require 
DJ. to expend an exorbitant amount of time and 
money. 
The district court continued, "Furthermore, this 
court believes that [SunCrest] could have 
significantly reduced the costs of bringing new 
counsel up to speed if [SunCrest] had filed its 
Motion to Disqualify Denver *418 Snuffer in a 
more timely fashion." It then devoted four 
paragraphs to the timeliness of SunCrest's motion to 
disqualify. Ultimately, the district court concluded, 
"Because disqualifying Denver Snuffer from the 
case at bar would result in significant financial and 
tactical prejudice to D.J., and in light of 
[SunCrest's] untimely filing of its Motion to 
Disqualify, this Court rejects [SunCrest's] motion 
and declines to disqualify Denver Snuffer from this 
litigation." 
Tf 8 On the issue of timeliness, SunCrest has 
asserted that its motion was timely because the 
district court did not rule that parol evidence of the 
parties' intent regarding provision 14 would be 
necessary until November 17, 2003, when the 
district court denied D.J.'s motion for summary 
judgment. SunCrest explains that, prior to that 
time, it believed that the terms of provision 14 were 
unambiguous and that there would therefore be no 
need for Snuffer's testimony regarding the parties' 
intent. But the district court found that, at 
minimum, SunCrest's argument established that 
there was a three month delay before it filed the 
motion to disqualify. Further, the district court 
found that SunCrest was placed on notice that D.J. 
intended to rely on parol evidence when DJ. filed 
its motion for summary judgment on December 20, 
2002, and that D.J.'s reliance on parol evidence " 
became abundantly clear" at oral argument on 
August 27, 2003. It also noted that "[SunCrest's] 
own pleadings intimate that [SunCrest] has ' 
reasonably foreseen,' since the initiation of this 
litigation[,] that Snuffer might be called as a witness 
in the case at bar." 
If 9 SunCrest filed an interlocutory appeal of the 
denial of its motion to disqualify Snuffer with the 
court of appeals, arguing that the district court erred 
in not properly balancing the interests of the parties. 
FN2
 The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the 
district court applied the correct balancing standard 
and did not abuse its discretion in deciding that the 
interests weighed against disqualifying Snuffer.1^3 
It also affirmed on the separate ground of 
untimeliness.™4 We granted certiorari to decide 
whether the court of appeals properly interpreted 
and applied rule 3.7(a)(3)'s substantial hardship 
exception. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code section 78-2-2(3)0), (5). 
FN2. D.J. Inv. Group, LLC v. 
DAE/Westbrook, LLC, 2005 UT App 
207,14,113 P.3d 1022. 
F N 3 . / d f l 3 , 5 , 7 . 
FN4.2tffJ6-7. 
[1] f 10 On certiorari, we review for correctness 
the decision of the court of appeals, not the decision 
of the district court.*7**5 In this case, we review for 
correctness the court of appeals' interpretation of 
rule 3.7(a) as well as the court of appeals' selection 
of the standard of review and its application of that 
standard to the district court's substantial hardship 
analysis. 
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FN5. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, 1 11, 
103 P.3d 699. 
f URule 3.7(a) of the Utah Rules of Professional 
Conduct states, "A lawyer shall not act as advocate 
at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a 
necessary witness unless: ... (a)(3) disqualification 
of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on 
the client." SunCrest argues that Snuffer is a 
necessary witness who should be disqualified in 
accordance with rule 3.7(a) and that we should 
therefore reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals. It asserts that the court of appeals did not 
correctly review the district court's conclusion that 
Snuffer's disqualification would cause substantial 
hardship to DJ . because the court of appeals did 
not require proper consideration of SunCrest's 
interests and the interests of the district court. In 
addressing SunCrest's arguments, we consider, first, 
whether the substantial hardship exception of rule 
3.7(a)(3) requires courts to balance the interests of 
the client with the interests of the opposing party 
and tribunal, and, second, whether the court of 
appeals properly affirmed the district court's 
conclusion that the substantial hardship exception 
applies in this case. 
I. THE SUBSTANTIAL HARDSHIP 
EXCEPTION REQUIRES A BALANCING OF 
INTERESTS CONSISTENT WITH THE 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE'S COMMENT TO 
[2] t 12 We initially hold that both the court of 
appeals and the district court were correct in 
concluding that the substantial hardship exception 
of rule 3.7(a)(3) requires a balancing of the 
hardship that a lawyer's disqualification would 
cause to the lawyer's client against the prejudice that 
the opposing party would suffer if the lawyer were 
to act as an advocate-witness at trial. In addition, 
we recognize that new revisions to the advisory 
committee's note to rule 3.7 have clarified that the 
balancing contemplated by the substantial hardship 
exception also calls for consideration of the 
interests of the tribunal, but we conclude that these 
revisions do not undermine the balancing of 
interests conducted by the district court in this case. 
1f 13Rule 3.7(a)(3) provides an exception to the 
advocate-witness prohibition where " 
disqualification of the lawyer would work 
substantial hardship on the client," but its plain 
language does not indicate how much hardship may 
be imposed on a client before the hardship becomes 
"substantial." FN6 Although the term "substantial" 
is, by nature, inexact and leaves the district court 
significant discretion, the advisory committee's 
comment to rule 3.7 provides some factors that the 
district court should consider before deciding 
whether the hardship in a case is "substantial." FN7 
As amended on November 1, 2005, the advisory 
committee's note to rule 3.7 states that the 
substantial hardship exception contained in rule 
3.7(a)(3)"recognizes that a balancing is required 
between the interests of the client and those of the 
tribunal and the opposing party." FN8 The 
comment further explains, 
FN6. Utah R. Prof 1 Conduct 3.7(a)(3). 
FN7. Utah R. Profl Conduct 3.7 advisory 
committee's comment. 
FN8. Id 
Whether the tribunal is likely to be misled or the 
opposing party is likely to suffer prejudice depends 
on the nature of the case, the importance and 
probable tenor of the lawyer's testimony, and the 
probability that the lawyer's testimony will conflict 
with that of other witnesses. Even if there is a risk 
of such prejudice, in determining whether the 
lawyer should be disqualified, due regard must be 
given to the effect of disqualification on the 
lawyer's client. It is relevant that one or both 
parties could reasonably foresee that the lawyer 
would probably be a witness.™9 
FN9. Id. 
[3][4] t 14 While advisory committee comments 
to rules adopted by this court are not "authoritative," 
we give them "great weight." FN1° We generally 
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consider the comments a fairly reliable indicator of 
our intent in adopting the rules because the 
comments to the rules were available to this court at 
the time of their adoption.™11 In this particular 
case, where revisions to the advisory committee's 
comment to rule 3.7 were recently approved by this 
court, the advisory committee's comment carries 
even greater weight. We therefore conclude that, 
when determining whether the hardship to a client 
caused by disqualification of the client's lawyer is " 
substantial," and thus provides an exception to rule 
3.7(a)(3)'s prohibition against acting in the dual role 
of advocate-witness, the courts should conduct a 
balancing of interests that is consistent with the 
comment to rule 3.7. 
FN10. Burns v. State, 2006 UT 14, f 18 
n. 6, 133 P.3d 370 (discussing the weight 
of the advisory committee's notes to the 
Utah Rules of Evidence); see also 
Featherstone v. Schaerrer, 2001 UT 86, fl 
23, 34 P.3d 194 (citing "the official 
comment" to rule 4.2 of the Utah Rules of 
Professional Conduct). 
FN11. Burns, 2006 UT 14, f 18 n. 6, 133 
P.3d 370. 
[5] K 15 Our analysis thus far provides a simple 
prospective rule for courts applying the substantial 
hardship exception. However, for the purposes of 
this case, which was decided before our November 
1, 2005 amendments to the comment, we must also 
consider whether the amendments indicate that the 
district court applied the wrong legal standard. 
Pursuant to the prior version of the advisory 
committee's comment to rule 3.7 of *420 the Utah 
Rules of Professional Conduct,1^12 the district 
court expressly balanced the interests of the client 
against the interests of the opposing party to 
determine whether the hardship to the client was " 
substantial" but did not discuss the interests of the 
tribunal.1^13 SunCrest argues that the district 
court's omission of the tribunal's interest was a legal 
error. We disagree. 
FN12. See Utah R. Profl. Conduct 3.7 
advisory committee's comment (2005) 
(amended Nov. 1, 2005) ("[Pjaragraph 
(a)(3) recognizes that a balancing is 
required between the interests of the client 
and those of the opposing party. Whether 
the opposing party is likely to suffer 
prejudice depends on the nature of the 
case, the importance and probable tenor of 
the lawyer's testimony, and the probability 
that the lawyer's testimony will conflict 
with that of other witnesses. Even if there 
is risk of such prejudice, in determining 
whether the lawyer should be disqualified, 
due regard must be given to the effect of 
disqualification on the lawyer's client. It 
is relevant that one or both parties could 
reasonably foresee that the lawyer would 
probably be a witness."). 
FN13. D.J. Inv. Group, L.L.C. v. 
DAE/Westbrook L.L.C, 2005 UT App 
207,14, 113 P.3d 1022. 
f^ 16 We view the addition of the tribunal's interest 
as a refinement granting additional discretion to the 
tribunal in conducting the substantial hardship 
balancing. Our November 2005 ^amendments to the 
advisory committee's comment to rule 3.7 leave the 
core balancing test intact and do not add any new 
factors. Instead, it indicates that the factors that are 
relevant to whether the opposing party is likely to 
suffer prejudice are also relevant to determining 
whether the 'tribunal is likely to be misled." FNU 
Under the revised comment, there is significant 
overlap between the interests of the tribunal and the 
interests of the parties. For example, in this case, 
SunCrest argues that the district court has an 
interest in avoiding the frequent intervention needed 
to remedy the jury confusion that naturally results 
when a lawyer acts as both an advocate and a 
witness in the same trial. But we note that the 
district court may also have an interest in avoiding 
the delay and confusion that results when new 
counsel is introduced late into a complex case. 
These interests overlap with SunCrest's interest in 
avoiding jury confusion and with D.J.'s interest in 
avoiding the difficulties associated with bringing 
new counsel up to speed late in a case. Ultimately, 
the revised comment to rule 3.7 gives the district 
© 2007 Thomson/West No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
Page 9 of 
147P.3d414 Page 8 
147 P.3d 414, 563 Utah Adv. Rep. 16,2006 UT 62 
(Cite as: 147 P.3d 414) 
court the power to decide which interests are * ill A. The Court of Appeals Properly Applied a 
stronger and to factor its own interests into the Deferential Standard of Review to the District 
balancing. Court's Substantial Hardship Determination 
FN 14. See Utah R. Profl Conduct 3.7 
advisory committers comment. 
\ 17 In sum, we recognize that separate 
consideration of the interests of the tribunal under 
the revised advisory committee's comment to rule 
3.7 may more clearly account for the broader 
impact of a lawyer's involvement or 
disqualification. But because of the substantial 
overlap between the interests of the court and the 
parties and the revised comment's effect of resting 
more discretion in the trial court, we conclude that 
express consideration of the tribunal's interest is not 
indispensable to the balancing in this case. Given 
that the district court applied the substantial 
hardship analysis described by the comment to rule 
3f7 prior to the 2005 amendments, it did not err by 
balancing only the interests of the parties. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE 
ITS DISCRETION IN DETERMINING THAT 
DISQUALIFICATION OF SNUFFER WOULD 
CAUSE SUBSTANTIAL HARDSHIP TO D.J. 
\ 18 Having determined that the court of appeals 
correctly interpreted the substantial hardship 
exception of rule 3.7, we now proceed to answer the 
second part of the question on certiorari; namely, 
whether the court of appeals properly upheld the 
district court's application of rule 3.7(a)'s substantial 
hardship exception. We hold that it did. Our 
analysis on this point requires two steps. We will 
first consider whether the court of appeals 
appropriately selected the deferential abuse of 
discretion standard of review that it applied to the 
district court's decision. Because we conclude that 
it did, we will then consider whether the court of 
appeals correctly applied this standard in reviewing 
the district court's determination that Snuffer's 
disqualification would cause substantial hardship to 
DJ. 
[6] \ 19 The court of appeals stated that it gave the 
district court "some deference" in its application of 
the substantial hardship exception to the facts of 
this case, and it reviewed the district court's 
substantial hardship analysis under an "abuse of 
discretion" standard of review.FN15 SunCrest 
argues that the district court failed to consider 
SunCrest's interests and that this failure constituted 
a mistake of law that the court of appeals should 
have reviewed for correctness rather than for an 
abuse of discretion. We hold that the court of 
appeals properly applied a deferential abuse of 
discretion standard, though the deference given to 
the district court's substantial hardship 
determination should be characterized as "broad 
deference" rather than "some deference." 
FN15. DJ, Inv. Group, LLC, 2005 UT 
App207,1f3,113 R3d 1022. 
K 20 Because the district court stated that it had 
balanced the interests of both parties as required by 
the advisory committee's comment to rule 3.7, we 
have already concluded that the district court did 
not make a mistake of law regarding the legal 
standard to be applied, as SunCrest contends. The 
question we now consider is a mixed question of 
fact and law-whether the district court appropriately 
applied the substantial hardship exception to the 
facts before it. 
[7] K 21 To select the appropriate standard of 
review for this mixed question, we turn to the 
three-factor test described in State v. Levin™16 
Under that test, we select a standard of review from 
along a spectrum of deference by weighing the 
following factors: 
FN16. 2006 UT 50, f 25, 144 P.3d 1096. 
(1) the degree of variety and complexity in the facts 
to which the legal rule is to be applied; (2) the 
degree to which a trial court's application of the 
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legal rule relies on "facts" observed by the trial 
judge such as a witness's appearance and demeanor, 
relevant to the application of the law that cannot be 
adequately reflected in the record available to 
appellate courts; and (3) other policy reasons that 
weigh for or against granting discretion to trial 
courts.™17 
FN 17. Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
f 22 These factors weigh in favor of granting 
broad deference to a district court's application of 
the substantial hardship exception. First, the facts 
involved in district courts' substantial hardship 
determinations are " 'so complex and varying that 
no rule adequately addressing the relevance of all 
these facts can be spelled out ' " ™18 Although 
the advisory committee comment to rule 3.7 gives 
helpful guidance in the form of factors that are 
relevant to determining whether a lawyer's dual role 
as an advocate-witness would ordinarily harm the 
interests of the opposing party or tribunal, these 
factors are generally open-ended and leave much 
discretion to the district court™19 Even when 
factors demonstrating prejudice are present, the 
comment instructs that the district court must give " 
due regard ... to the effect of disqualification on the 
lawyer's client.''™20 
FN18. Id. f 28, 144 P.3d 1096 (quoting 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (1994)). 
FN19. See Utah R. Profl Conduct 3.7 
advisory committee's comment ("Whether 
the tribunal is likely to be misled or the 
opposing party is likely to suffer prejudice 
depends on the nature of the case, the 
importance and probable tenor of the 
lawyer's testimony, and the probability that 
the lawyer's testimony will conflict with 
that of other witnesses. Even if there is 
risk of prejudice, in determining whether 
the lawyer should be disqualified, due 
regard must be given to the effect of 
disqualification on the lawyer's client It 
is relevant that one or both parties could 
Page 9 
reasonably foresee that the lawyer would 
probably be a witness."). 
FN20, Id. 
% 23 Second, the substantial hardship inquiry relies 
on observations made by the district court regarding 
the proceeding and the parties before it that cannot 
adequately be reflected in the record. The district 
court is intimately connected with its own interests 
in the case and has special knowledge of other 
relevant facts, including the nature of the case, the 
importance and probable tenor *422 of the lawyer's 
testimony, and the effect that disqualification would 
have on the lawyer's client. The district court is 
also in a better position to understand whether 
either of the parties should have foreseen that the 
lawyer would become a necessary witness and 
whether this tends to show that the hardship to the 
client should be discounted or that the motion to 
disqualify is motivated by gamesmanship. 
If 24 Third, policy considerations weigh in favor of 
granting additional deference. In Houghton v. 
Department of Health™21 we said that "[tjrial 
courts are usually given broad discretion in 
controlling the conduct of attorneys in matters 
before the court" and that "their discretion extends 
to deciding whether disqualification is a proper 
sanction after a finding of an ethical violation." ™22 
But we also held that ' to the extent this court 
has a special interest in administering the law 
governing attorney ethical rules, a trial court's 
discretion is limited." ™23 
FN21. 962 P.2d 58 (Utah 1998), overruled 
on other grounds by Ark. Dep't of Health 
& Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 
126 S.Ct. 1752, 1756, 164 L.Ed.2d 459 
(2006). 
FN22. Id. at 61; see also Featherstone v. 
Schaerrer, 2001 UT 86, f 30 n. 7, 34 
P.3d 194 ("It is within [courts'] broad 
discretion to control the conduct of 
attorneys in matters before the court, 
especially where factual assessments are 
necessary to the determination of such 
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t r ibunal . 2 7 The fourth factor considers the 
effect that the lawyer's disqualification will have on 
the client and specifies that "due regard must be 
given" to this effect even if there is risk of prejudice 
to the opposing party.™28 Finally, the fifth factor 
states, "It is relevant that one or both parties could 
reasonably foresee that the lawyer would probably 
be a witness."™29 
FN26. Utah R. Profl Conduct 3.7 advisory 
committee's comment. 
FN27. Id. ("Whether the tribunal is likely 
to be misled or the opposing party is likely 
to suffer prejudice depends on the nature 
of the case, the importance and probable 
tenor of the lawyer's testimony, and the 
probability that the lawyer's testimony will 
conflict with that of other witnesses."). 
FN28. Id. 
FN29.M 
f 30 In applying the substantial hardship exception 
to the facts of this case, the district court focused its 
analysis on the fourth and fifth factors mentioned in 
the comment. The district court first discussed the 
complexity and length of the litigation, the size of 
the record filed with the court, and the expense and 
time that would be required for D J. to bring new 
trial counsel into the case-all of which are relevant 
to the hardship imposed on DJ. The court then 
discussed SunCrest's culpability in contributing to 
DJ.'s hardship by failing to file its motion to 
disqualify Snuffer earlier in the parties' preparations 
for trial. The district court observed that " 
[SunCrest's] own pleadings intimate that [SunCrest] 
has 'reasonably foreseen,' since the initiation of 
this litigation[,] that Snuffer might be called as a 
witness in the case at bar." Ultimately, the court 
concluded, "Because disqualifying Denver Snuffer 
from the case at bar would result in significant 
financial and tactical prejudice to D.J., and in light 
of [SunCrest's] untimely filing of its Motion to 
Disqualify, this Court rejects [SunCrest's] motion 
and declines to disqualify Denver Snuffer from this 
litigation." 
If 31 The text and structure of this analysis show 
that the district court considered the facts that it 
found in connection with the fourth and fifth factors 
from the advisory committee comment to rule 3.7 
-the hardship caused to the lawyer's client and the 
ability of the parties to foresee the necessity of the 
lawyer's testimony-to define the parties' respective 
interests in this case. It is true, as SunCrest points 
out, that the district court did not explicitly make 
findings with regard to the first three factors that are 
listed in the advisory committee's comment to rule 
3.7 as relevant to the opposing party's interests. 
But it is apparent from the district court's analysis 
that it considered the fifth factor, foreseeability, to 
be the factor most relevant to its assessment of 
SunCrest's interests. We do not assume that the 
district court ignored the factors from the comment 
to rule 3.7 that it did not explicitly address. 
Instead, we assume that the court discussed those 
factors it considered important to the result. In 
sum, we hold that the district court articulated its 
factual findings "with sufficient detail so that the 
basis of the ultimate conclusion can be understood." 
FN30 
FN30. Consolidation Coal Co., 886 P.2d 
at 521. 
[9] \ 32 Having established that the district court's 
findings regarding the parties interests were 
sufficiently articulated, we turn to consider whether 
the district court abused its discretion in weighing 
these factors*424 with respect to the substantial 
hardship exception. We conclude that it did not. 
As we discussed above, the advisory committee's 
comment to rule 3.7 does not indicate how the 
factors should be weighed together, and it leaves 
much discretion to the district court to determine 
whether a lawyer should be disqualified.™31 
Furthermore, the district court's interpretation of the 
factors in the context of this case appears to be quite 
reasonable. 
FN31. See supra ff 22-25. 
[10][11] | 33 A delay in filing a motion to 
disqualify counsel or in notifying opposing counsel 
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that a motion to disqualify is likely raises concerns 
that the party who delays may be using the motion 
as a manipulative litigation tactic.™32 This 
concern naturally enters into the balancing of 
interests and is addressed, in part, by the " 
foreseeability" factor from the advisoiy committee's 
comment to rule 3.7.FN33 In Zions First National 
Bank v. Barbara Jensen Interiors, Inc.™2'* the 
court of appeals stated that "[a] motion to disqualify 
counsel must be immediately filed and diligently 
pursued as soon as the party becomes aware of the 
basis for disqualification, and it may not be used as 
a manipulative litigation tactic." FN35 Thus, the 
timeliness of the motion to disqualify is relevant to 
the balancing regardless of whether it also 
constitutes a separate ground for rejecting the 
motion to disqualify. 
FN32. See Utah R. Prof 1 Conduct scope (" 
[T]he purpose of the Rules can be 
subverted when they are invoked by 
opposing parties as procedural weapons."); 
see also Zions First Nat'l Bank v. 
Barbara Jensen Interiors, Inc., 781 P.2d 
478, 480-81 (Utah Ct.App.1989) ("A 
motion to disqualify ... may not be used as 
a manipulative litigation tactic"). 
FN33. Utah R. Profl Conduct 3.7 advisory 
committee's comment. 
FN34. 781 P.2d at 480-81. 
FN35.W. 
% 34 Ultimately, it appears that the district court 
concluded that SunCrest's culpability in filing an 
untimely motion was the factor most relevant to the 
weight of its interests and that, given SunCrest's 
weak claim to prejudice, the hardship to DJ. was 
significant enough for the substantial hardship 
exception to apply in this case. In so finding, the 
district court was acting within its broad discretion 
to contrpl the conduct of the attorneys in a matter 
before the court. 
Tf 35 SunCrest offers three arguments in further 
support of its claim that the district court failed to 
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adequately factor SunCrest's interests into the 
balancing test, none of which is persuasive. First, 
SunCrest claims that the district court erred because 
it simply assumed that Snuffer's testimony was 
necessary under rule 3.7 rather than making a 
specific factual finding to that effect. SunCrest 
argues that, by doing so, the court inevitably gave 
too little weight to SunCrest's interests, which 
depend in part on "the importance and probable 
tenor of the lawyer's testimony" and "the 
probability that the lawyer's testimony will conflict 
with that of other witnesses." We do not agree. 
The district court advanced judicial economy in the 
face of a complex factual dispute by making only 
those findings that were dispositive to its balancing 
of interests and assuming that other facts favored 
SunCrest. 
[12] If 36 Second, SunCrest argues that monetary 
hardship should never be sufficient to support a 
finding of "substantial hardship." However, there 
is nothing in the language of rule 3.7 that requires 
the potential hardship to the client to be unique or 
of a nonmonetary nature, only "substantial." FN36 
FN36. Utah R. Profl Conducts.7. advisory 
committee's comment 
f 37 Third, SunCrest argues that the district court 
misunderstood the scope of the disqualification 
required by rule 3.7 and that this misunderstanding 
led the district court to ascribe too much weight to 
DJ.'s interests. Although SunCrest is likely correct 
that rule 3.7 would not require a lawyer to be 
disqualified from the case altogether, but only from 
acting as trial counsel, FN37 the district court's 
written decision contains no discussion*425 of the 
extent of the disqualification required by rule 3.7, 
and the decision gives no indication that the district 
court misinterpreted the extent of Snuffer's 
disqualification when it weighed the interests of the 
parties. 
FN37. See Utah R. Profl Conduct 3.7(a) (" 
A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial 
in which the lawyer is likely to be a 
necessary witness unless ... [ (3) ] 
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disqualification of the lawyer would work 
substantial hardship on the client." 
(emphasis added)). 
f 38 Furthermore, we note that in this case the 
district court based its assessment of the hardship to 
D.J. on the significant time and expense required to 
introduce a new lawyer into this complex case and 
on the tactical disadvantage that Snuffer's 
disqualification would cause to DJ. Because D.J. 
would not be able to avoid designating new trial 
counsel if Snuffer were disqualified, D.J. would 
suffer very similar hardships regardless of the extent 
of Snuffer's disqualification. In sum, we hold that 
the court of appeals correctly concluded both that 
the district court's decision contained adequate 
findings to support its substantial hardship 
determination and that the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in finding that DJ. would suffer 
substantial hardship if Snuffer were disqualified. 
1f 39 Although rule 3.7 of the Utah Rules of 
Professional Conduct generally prohibits a lawyer 
from acting as both an advocate and a witness at the 
same trial, that rule provides an exception where the 
client would suffer "substantial hardship" as a result 
of the lawyer's disqualification. We hold that the " 
substantial hardship exception" requires a balancing 
of interests as described in the advisory committee 
comment to rule 3.7 of the Utah Rules of 
Professional Conduct, but that the court of appeals 
did not err in following the prior version of rule 3.7 
's advisory committee's comment in this case. 
Furthermore, we conclude that the district court's 
substantial hardship determination is a mixed 
question of fact and law that implicates the district 
court's broad discretion to control the conduct of the 
lawyers before it. We therefore give significant 
deference to the district court's substantial hardship 
determination. Finally, we hold that the court of 
appeals correctly concluded that the district court 
did not abuse its discretion when it weighed the 
interests of the parties and decided that, in light of 
SunCrest's delay in filing the motion to disqualify 
and the financial and tactical hardship that would be 
suffered by DJ . if Snuffer were disqualified, the 
Page 13 
substantial hardship exception applied in this case. 
We therefore affirm. 
If 40 Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief Justice 
Wilkins, Justice Parrish, and Justice Nehring concur 
in Justice Durrant's opinion. 
Utah,2006. 
DJ. Investment Group, L.L.C. v. Dae/Westbrook, 
L.L.C. 
147 P.3d 414, 563 Utah Adv. Rep. 16,2006 UT 62 
END OF DOCUMENT 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
Wsstlaw. 
781P.2d478 Page 1 
781 P.2d478 
(Cite as: 781 P.2d 478) 
c 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, a national asso-
ciation, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
BARBARA JENSEN INTERIORS, INC., Lowell N. 
Jensen, and Barbara W. Jensen, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
No.880207-CA. 
Oct. 6,1989. 
In bank's suit against maker and guarantors of 
promissory note, the Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, Raymond S. Uno, J., granted bank's motion 
to compel settlement and denied obligors' motion to 
disqualify bank's legal counsel. Obligors appealed 
from both rulings. The Court of Appeals, Orme, J., 
held that: (1) trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
granting bank's motion to compel settlement, and (2) 
obligors' motion to disqualify bank's counsel was un-
timely. 
Affirmed. 
Davidson, J., concurred and filed opinion. 
Bench, J., concurred and dissented and filed opinion. 
West Headnotes 
111 Compromise and Settlement €^>2 
89k2 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 89k 1) 
m Compromise and Settlement <£zz>2\ 
89k21 Most Cited Cases 
Voluntary settlement of legal dispute is favored by 
law and, under certain circumstances, settlement 
agreement may be summarily enforced as executory 
accord. 
[21 Appeal and Error €=>1126 
30k 1126 Most Cited Cases 
Appellate court will affirm granting of motion to 
compel settlement if record establishes binding 
agreement and if excuse for nonperformance is com-
paratively unsubstantial. 
[31 Compromise and Settlement €^>23(3) 
89k23(3) Most Cited Cases 
Finding that defendants orally agreed to settlement of 
lawsuit, entitling plaintiff to summary enforcement of 
that agreement, was supported by affidavit of 
plaintiffs representative stating unequivocally that 
parties had reached agreement, that terms of agree-
ment were summarized and repeated for parties by 
plaintiffs attorney, and that representative observed 
defendants agree to terms of agreement. 
£41 Compromise and Settlement C^>5(3) 
89k5(3) Most Cited Cases 
Law does not require that settlement agreements be 
written to be enforceable. 
[51 Attorney and Client €=>21.20 
45k21.20 Most Cited Cases 
Motion to disqualify counsel must be immediately 
filed and diligently pursued as soon as party becomes 
aware of basis for disqualification, and it may not be 
used as manipulative litigation tactic. 
[61 Attorney and Client €^>21.20 
45k21.20 Most Cited Cases 
Defendants' motion to disqualify plaintiffs counsel 
was untimely, and thus properly denied, where filed 
nearly seven months after law firm appeared as 
plaintiffs counsel, more than three months after de-
fendants claimed to have first learned of basis for 
motion, and one day before scheduled hearing on 
plaintiffs motion to compel settlement. 
*478 Charles C. Brown, Jeffrey B. Brown, and 
Budge W. Call, Salt Lake City, for defendants and 
appellants. 
*479 James S. Jardine and Rick L. Rose, Salt Lake 
City, for plaintiff and respondent. 
Before DAVIDSON, BENCH and ORME, JJ. 
ORME, Judge: 
Defendants Barbara Jensen Interiors, Inc., Lowell N. 
Jensen, and Barbara W. Jensen ("the Jensens") appeal 
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from the trial court's order granting plaintiff Zions 
First National Bank's motion to compel settlement 
and denying the Jensens' motion to disqualify Zions' 
legal counsel. We affirm. 
FACTS 
In June of 1986, Zions Bank filed this action against 
Barbara Jensen Interiors, Inc. to collect on a promis-
sory note. Lowell and Barbara Jensen were also 
named as defendants as they had personally guar-
antied the note. Zions Bank arranged to depose the 
Jensens at the law offices of Ray, Quinney & Ne-
beker, Zions' substitute counsel in this matter, on 
February 10, 1987. The Jensens and their attorney 
attended the scheduled depositions, but settlement ne-
gotiations began instead. According to Zions, these 
negotiations culminated in settlement. However, as 
the Jensens see it, the parties only agreed that Zions' 
attorney would prepare certain documents setting 
forth a proposed settlement. In any event, the Jen-
sens' depositions wero not taken. 
On February 18, 1987, Zions' attorney delivered the 
settlement documents he had prepared to the Jensens' 
attorney. Despite repeated requests by Zions' attor-
ney, the Jensens refused to sign the documents, ulti-
mately contending that no firm settlement had been 
reached during the February 10 negotiations. On 
April 13, 1987, Zions filed a motion to compel settle-
ment, along with the affidavit of Donald M. Bennett, 
an employee of Zions who participated in the settle-
ment negotiations as Zions' representative. 
On May 20,1987, several months after Ray, Quinney 
& Nebeker had first appeared as Zions' legal counsel 
and only one day before Zions' motion to compel set-
tlement was to be heard, the Jensens filed a motion to 
disqualify the law firm from its representation of 
Zions in this action. The Jensens filed an affidavit 
stating that an attorney at Ray, Quinney & Nebeker 
had represented them in several matters between 
1979 and 1983. 
After a hearing at which both parties' motions were 
argued, the district court granted Zions' motion to 
compel settlement, concluding that the record estab-
lished an oral settlement had been reached and agreed 
to by both parties during the February 10 negoti-
ations. The court also noted that, consistent with a 
settlement having been reached, the Jensens' depos-
itions were cancelled and the trial date stricken by 
Zions. The court also denied the Jensens' motion to 
disqualify Zions' legal counsel, holding the motion 
was untimely because it had been filed more than 
three months after the Jensens claimed to have first 
learned of the basis for their motion. The court fur-
ther held the motion lacked substantive merit as Ray, 
Quinney & Nebeker had ceased its representation of 
the Jensens by December 1983, and the substance of 
the prior representations was unrelated to the present 
action. The Jensens appeal both decisions. 
MOTION TO COMPEL SETTLEMENT 
nir21 Voluntary settlement of legal disputes is 
favored by the law and, under certain circumstances, 
a settlement agreement may be summarily enforced 
as an executory accord. See Mascaro v. Davis. 741 
P.2d 938. 942 (Utah 1987). "The decision of a trial 
court to summarily enforce a settlement agreement 
will not be reversed on appeal unless it is shown that 
there was an abuse of discretion." Id. at 942 n. 11. 
Thus, we affirm the granting of a motion to compel 
settlement if the record establishes a binding agree-
ment and "the excuse for nonperformance is compar-
atively unsubstantial." Tracy-Collins Bank <£ Trust 
Co. v. Travelstead. 592 P.2d 605. 609 (Utah 1979). 
See also, e.g., Murray v. State. 737 P.2d 1000. 
1000-01 (Utah 1987): Robinson v. Department of 
Natural Resources. 620 P.2d 519. 520 (Utah 1980). 
*480 [3J The Jensens claim their affidavit demon-
strates they did not assent to an oral settlement during 
the February 10 negotiations and thus, at a minimum, 
the issue should have been submitted to a jury. 
However, our review of the Jensens' affidavit does 
not convince us that the district court abused its dis-
cretion in granting Zions' motion. In their affidavit, 
the Jensens state: 
At the time of [the February 10 negotiations], we 
believed that no firm settlement was reached; 
rather, we understood that terms of the settlement 
were to be prepared by counsel for [Zions] and put 
in writing to be signed by us, if we were in agree-
ment to the terms as set forth in writing.... 
Since the time [of] said discussions, we have de-
cided not to enter into any settlement agreement 
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and for that reason have refused to sign any settle-
ment agreement. 
In contrast, Donald Bennett's affidavit states unequi-
vocally that after negotiating for over one hour, Zions 
and the Jensens reached an agreement, the terms of 
which were summarized and repeated for the parties 
by Zions' attorney. Bennett further states that he, in 
his capacity as Zions' representative, agreed to the 
settlement and "observed [the Jensens] agree to the 
terms of the settlement agreement." The Jensens' af-
fidavit wholly fails to identify any statements made 
or actions taken by them at the time of the negoti-
ations which would contradict Bennett's claim that 
the Jensens' agreed to the settlement that had been ne-
gotiated. Rather, the Jensens' affidavit merely iden-
tifies their unsubstantiated and entirely unilateral "un-
derstanding" and "beliefs" as to the legal effect of 
these discussions and their actions. On the record be-
fore us, it appears that these "understandings" were 
the Jensens' private thoughts and were not expressed 
to Zions. 
It is well established in the law that unexpressed in-
tentions do not affect the validity of a contract.... 
"The apparent mutual assent of the parties ... must 
be gathered by the language employed by them, 
and the law imputes to a person an intention corres-
ponding to the reasonable meaning of its words and 
acts." 
Jaramillo v. Farmers Ins. Group, 669 P.2d 1231. 
1233 (Utah 1983) (quoting Allen v. Bissinger & Co., 
62 Utah 226.219 P. 539.541-42 (1923)). 
[41 Accordingly, if the Jensens did not wish to settle 
this dispute, they should have clearly expressed such 
an intention during the settlement conference which 
was held in lieu of their depositions. Had they done 
so, they would have been in a position to defeat sum-
mary enforcement of the settlement through an affi-
davit identifying the specific statements and actions 
they had taken to communicate to Zions their de-
cision not to accept the settlement offer at that time. 
Absent such information, and given only the Jensens' 
unexplained conclusion as to their otherwise undis-
closed beliefs, Bennett's statement that the Jensens 
actually agreed to the settlement stands uncontrover-
ted. Accordingly, we cannot say the trial court ab-
used its discretion in compelling the settlement. 
IFN11 
FN1. Our decision in Brown v. Brown, 744 
P.2d 333 (Utah Ct.App.1987). does not re-
quire a different result. Although some dis-
cussion in that opinion may tend to imply 
that settlement agreements must be in the 
form of a written stipulation to be enforce-
able, that opinion's focus on the require-
ments for a valid court stipulation, Statute of 
Frauds implications, and a dispute about the 
authority of one party's attorney to bind the 
party to the settlement, all serve to distin-
guish that case from the instant one. In any 
event, Utah law simply does not require set-
tlement agreements to be written to be en-
forceable. See, e.g., Murray v. State. 737 
P.2d 1000. 1001 (Utah 1987) ("The fact that 
plaintiffs had not yet signed a written 
[settlement] agreement is of no legal con-
sequence. It is a basic and longstanding 
principle of contract law that [settlement] 
agreements are enforceable even though 
there is neither a written memor[i]alization 
of that agreement nor the signatures of the 
parties, unless specifically required by the 
statute of frauds."). See also Kukla v. Na-
tional Distillers Prods. Co.. 483 F.2d 619. 
621 (6th Cir.1973) (a settlement agreement 
is binding even if it has not been reduced to 
writing). 
MOTION TO DISQUALIFY COUNSEL 
[51(61 A motion to disqualify counsel must be imme-
diately filed and diligently pursued as soon as the 
party becomes *481 aware of the basis for disquali-
fication, and it may not be used as a manipulative lit-
igation tactic. See, e.g., Smith v. Whatcott. 757 F.2d 
1098. 1099-1100 (10th Cir.1985): Redd v. Shell Oil 
Co.. 518 F.2d 311. 315 (10th Cir.1975): Marmdies v. 
Upchurch. 696 P.2d 1195. 1202 (Utah 1985). The 
district court held the Jensens' motion to be untimely 
because it was filed nearly seven months after Ray, 
Quinney & Nebeker appeared as Zions' counsel, and 
more than three months after the February 10 settle-
ment negotiations. The Jensens claim the basis for 
disqualification remained unknown to them until well 
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into the course of this litigation, but admittedly 
learned of the asserted basis no later than the Febru-
ary 10 settlement negotiations, at which time the Jen-
sens recalled having been in the Ray, Quinney & Ne-
beker office building previously to visit their former 
attorney. IFN2I However, the motion was filed three 
months later, and one day before Zions' motion to 
compel settlement was scheduled to be heard. We 
agree with the district court that under these circum-
stances, the Jensens' motion to disqualify counsel was 
untimely. 
FN2. Claiming not to remember the name of 
one's former law firm but to recognize its of-
fice interior may seem disingenuous at first 
blush. The Jensens involvement with interior 
design, however, may well explain this 
oddity. 
CONCLUSION 
We affirm both the grant of Zions' motion to compel 
settlement and the denial of the Jensens' motion to 
disqualify counsel. 
DAVIDSON, Judge (concurring): 
I concur in the main opinion but I write separately to 
express a concern about the rules contained in the 
Code of Judicial Administration. As pointed out in 
the dissent, rule 4-504(8) of the Code of Judicial Ad-
ministration states: 
No orders, judgments or decrees based upon stipu-
lation shall be signed or entered unless the stipula-
tion is in writing, signed by the attorneys of record 
for the respective parties and filed with the clerk or 
the stipulation was made on the record. 
This rule was formerly a rule of practice in the courts 
and was therefore not afforded the full enforcement 
of a rule of civil procedure. Since the rule has now 
been elevated into the Code of Judicial Administra-
tion, it is now entitled to enforcement equal to that 
given other rules. However, if this rule is strictly 
followed and enforced, the way the law is applied 
will be dramatically changed and in this case, at least, 
other existing law is ignored. I am unwilling to slav-
ishly follow the rule at issue in the face of evidence 
showing a stipulation entered into by the parties but 
not agreed to in writing. Other oral agreements are 
enforceable when the evidence establishes their exist-
ence. So too should oral stipulations be enforced 
when the evidence shows their existence. 
BENCH, Judge (concurring and dissenting): 
I concur in the main opinion's treatment of the Jen-
sens' motion to disqualify Zions's legal counsel. I 
dissent from my colleagues' analysis of Zions's mo-
tion to compel settlement. I believe the trial court's 
grant of that motion was an abuse of discretion. 
Our Code of Judicial Administration, rule 4-504(8) 
provides as follows: 
No orders, judgments or decrees based upon stipu-
lation shall be signed or entered unless the stipula-
tion is in writing, signed by the attorneys of record 
for the respective parties and filed with the clerk or 
the stipulation was made on the record. 
In Brown v. Brown. 744 P.2d 333 (Utah 
Ct.App.1987). this court applied the predecessor to 
rule 4-504(8) [FN 11 and expressly held that settle-
ment agreements must be in the *482 form of a writ-
ten stipulation to be enforceable. I believe Brown is 
indistinguishable from the instant case. 
FN1. Previously, rule 4.5(b) of the Rules of 
Practice in the District Courts and Circuit 
Courts provided that 
No orders, judgments or decrees upon stipu-
lation shall be signed or entered unless such 
stipulation is in writing, signed by the attor-
neys of record for the respective parties and 
filed with the clerk, provided that the stipu-
lation may be made orally in open court. 
The only exception to the rule that settlement agree-
ments must be in writing is where the parties concede 
the existence of an agreement. See, e.g., Murray v. 
State. 737 P.2d 1000. 1001 (Utah 1987) (conceded at 
oral argument). fFN21 Throughout the instant case, 
the Jensens have consistently denied that an agree-
ment was ever reached. 
FN2. Where an agreement is admitted but 
not written, an evidentiary hearing may be 
necessary to determine the terms of the 
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agreement. See Brown. 744 P.2d at 337 n. 3 
(Orme, J., dissenting). See also Kukla v. Na-
tional Distillers Prods. Co.. 483 F.2d 619 
(6th Cir.1973) (if the existence or the terms 
of a settlement agreement are in dispute, it is 
improper for the court to enforce the alleged 
agreement without an evidentiary hearing). 
In view of the clear language of rule 4-504(8) and our 
decision in Brown. I would reverse the order compel-
ling settlement and remand the case for trial. 
781 P.2d478 
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